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Retributivism, Agency, and the 
Voluntary Act Requirement 
 
Christopher P. Taggart* 
 
Abstract 
 
The Voluntary Act Requirement (“VAR”) is the fundamental 
predicate for imposing legal punishment.  Punishing solely on the 
basis of evil thoughts or a villainous character is impermissible.  
The VAR also embodies the notion that we must not punish 
someone for conduct over which she lacked sufficient control.  But 
why not punish someone for conduct that was not within her 
control?  One answer is retributivist—it would be unjust to do so 
because that defendant could not have been morally responsible 
for, and therefore could not deserve punishment for, what she did.  
Agent causalism is a contentious view about how criminal 
defendants voluntarily act according to which the defendants 
themselves cause their free, morally responsible actions, as 
opposed to events or states of affairs involving them, their brains, 
their circumstances, and so forth.  This article argues that for 
retributivist justifications of the VAR to be plausible, agent 
causalism must be true.  Agent causalism might be false, and if 
it is, then retributivism could not play any role in justifying our 
fundamental legal precondition for ever imposing any criminal 
liability upon anyone.  This article does not argue that agent 
causalism is false, however.  It elaborates and renders plausible 
an agent causalist position, and it shows how that position could 
handle types of cases that notoriously pose challenges to the 
VAR—cases involving complex unconscious conduct, cases 
involving crimes of omission, and cases involving habitual 
conduct. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
* Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School. I wish to thank Palma Paciocco and 
Mike Materni for very helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
1
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Our criminal legal system requires that someone act 
voluntarily before legal punishment is imposed upon her.  This 
idea is fundamental to the state ever being justified in punishing 
anyone, and it is enshrined in our law in the form of the 
Voluntary Act Requirement (“VAR”).  Indeed, the American Law 
Institute (“ALI”) deems the VAR “the fundamental predicate for 
all criminal liability . . . .”1  According to the VAR, “the guilt of 
the defendant [must] be based upon conduct, and that conduct 
must include a voluntary act or an omission to perform an act of 
which the defendant [is] physically capable.”2 
Because the VAR is the fundamental precondition of any 
criminal liability, justifying the VAR is an important element of 
justifying our system of criminal law and our institution of 
criminal punishment.  At stake is justifying not just coercive, 
painful government intrusion into the lives of criminals.  
Punishment hurts criminals on purpose.  Ideally, we should have 
a good reason justifying every aspect of doing that.  If criminal 
law’s inclusion of the VAR is not defensible, then any attempt 
systematically to justify imposing punishment on anyone under 
our system would be woefully incomplete. 
Utilitarian3 and retributive theories of punishment are the 
two main avenues by which such explanations and justifications 
proceed.4  This article elaborates a relationship between 
 
1. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 explanatory note on subsection (1) (AM. LAW 
INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985). 
2. Id.  Put differently: 
 
A conviction of a defendant for crime C is justified only if (1) 
There is a voluntary act, the performance of which is 
necessary for C’s occurrence (given the statutory definition of 
C) and (2) the defendant has been shown (typically, beyond a 
reasonable doubt) to have performed such a voluntary act. 
 
Gideon Yaffe, The Voluntary Act Requirement, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION 
TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 174, 174 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012). 
3. I use utilitarian broadly to include any consequentialist, welfarist 
approach to normative analysis.  Included are welfarist views according to 
which the analyst does not simply sum up the values of individual utilities to 
determine the value of a situation featuring those individuals. 
4. See C. L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT 3 (Oxford Univ. Press 
1987) (“The philosophical debate on punishment has been dominated by two 
main types of theories of punishment, the utilitarian theory and the retributive 
theory.”). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/1
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retributivism and the VAR.  There is a contentious5 view about 
how criminal defendants, and human beings generally, 
voluntarily act, called agent causalism.  Roughly, agent 
causalism is the view that when we voluntarily act and are 
morally responsible for what we do, we are the causes of our 
conduct, as opposed to events or states of affairs, internal or 
external to us, that deterministically cause our conduct.  For 
example, if Fred assaults someone voluntarily and is morally 
responsible for doing so, then Fred causes his conduct—not 
states of or events in Fred’s brain, but Fred himself.  As will be 
elaborated, agent causalism has emerged from attempts to solve 
what has been called the problem of free will. 
This article’s main thesis is that for retributivist 
justifications of the VAR to be plausible, agent causalism must 
be true.  This thesis has a significant implication.  Because agent 
causalism is contentious, it might be false.6  And if agent 
causalism is false, then, according to this article’s thesis, it 
would be implausible that retributivism could play any role in 
substantiating the fundamental legal precondition of ever 
imposing any criminal liability upon anyone. 
This article’s point of departure is the VAR as it is codified 
at § 2.01 of the Model Penal Code (“MPC”).  Therefore, it is 
important to address one of the ALI’s official comments on MPC 
§ 2.01 up front: 
 
The term “voluntary” as used in [§ 2.01] does not 
inject into the criminal law questions about 
determinism and free will. Rather, it focuses upon 
conduct that is within the control of the actor. 
There is sufficient difference between ordinary 
human activity and a reflex or a convulsion to 
make it desirable that they be distinguished for 
purposes of criminal responsibility by a term like 
 
5. By contentious, I do not mean merely likely to cause controversy.  By a 
contentious view, I also mean that reasonable, informed people disagree about 
the view.  For a view to be contentious, it must be at least coherent and 
somewhat plausible. 
6. Although I am inclined to think that agent causalism is true, this paper 
will try to establish only that it is coherent and plausible. 
3
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“voluntary.”7 
 
This comment seems to rule out the idea that a normative 
theory’s ability to justify the VAR could turn on the relationship 
between that theory, retributivism, and a view that is motivated 
by responding to questions about determinism and free will, 
agent causalism.  The comment also clarifies that the rationale 
behind the VAR focuses on whether an actor has control over her 
conduct.  Why does it matter whether the defendant was in 
control of what she did when we decide whether she is criminally 
responsible?  Why not punish someone for conduct that was not 
within her control?  Perhaps the most natural, but by no means 
the only, answer to this last question is that it would be unjust 
to do so because that defendant could not have been morally 
responsible for what she did.8 
Some of the questions that arise in debates about how to 
solve the problem of free will concern whether an actor can ever 
be morally responsible for her conduct given the degree or type 
of control over her conduct that she has or lacks.  Many care 
about the problem of free will because: (a) they want to have 
enough of the right kind of control over what they do to be 
morally responsible for what they do, at least sometimes, but (b) 
 
7. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and 
Revised Comments 1985). 
8. This answer is natural in part because a paradigmatic instance of 
criminal punishment “must be of an actual or supposed offender for his 
offense.”  H. L. A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in 
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 5 (Oxford 
Univ. Press 1967).  Along similar lines: 
 
I bring myself within the reach of the criminal law only when 
I act: only when thought and intention are given active 
embodiment in conduct which engages with the world, and 
which may thus impinge on the rights and interests that the 
criminal law aims to protect.  It also . . . seems appropriate 
because we can surely be held culpably responsible only for 
what is within our control; and, once we move beyond the 
realm of (mere) thought, it is our actions that we 
paradigmatically control. 
 
R. A. Duff, Acting, Trying, and Criminal Liability, in ACTION AND VALUE IN 
CRIMINAL LAW 75, 78 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter Duff, 
Acting, Trying and Criminal Liability]. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/1
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causal determinism9 seems to threaten that sort of control.  If 
they lack the requisite control, then they lack moral 
responsibility. 
The ALI’s comment to MPC § 2.01 suggests that: (i) issues 
surrounding the problem of free will have no bearing on the 
VAR, but (ii) issues surrounding an actor’s control are of central 
importance to the VAR.  Therefore, it would seem that whatever 
sense of a defendant’s control over her conduct the ALI has in 
mind must not be connected with whether that defendant is ever 
morally responsible for what she does.10  If what the ALI had in 
mind by an actor’s control had anything to do with her moral 
responsibility, then, the ALI’s protestations notwithstanding, 
the ALI would be injecting into criminal law questions about 
determinism and free will. 
Some questions about determinism and free will, the ones 
that animate the problem of free will, automatically get injected 
into any discussion that turns on whether an agent has the 
control requisite for moral responsibility.  This injection follows 
from: (1) what the problem of free will is about and one central 
reason why it is significant, that is, the connection between 
moral responsibility and control, and (2) the fact that some 
questions about determinism and free will arise in connection 
with that problem.  If control and moral responsibility are 
connected as they seem to be in many discussions of 
determinism and free will, then the ALI is injecting questions 
about determinism and free will into criminal law even though 
it claims not to be. 
Assume, however, that the ALI is not injecting questions 
about determinism and free will into criminal law.  More 
specifically, assume that: (a) the ALI’s rationale behind the VAR 
 
9. Causal determinism is the view that “the past and the laws of nature 
together determine, at every moment, a unique future. . . .”  Peter van Inwagen, 
How to Think about the Problem of Free Will, 12 J. ETHICS 327, 330 (2008) 
[hereinafter van Inwagen, How to Think]. 
10. I wish to thank Palma Paciocco and Mike Materni for pointing out that 
the ALI might be assuming that questions about determinism and free will are 
not injected into the criminal law by the VAR because the problem of free will 
has a solution, according to which we are often free and morally responsible 
for what we do.  In other words, the ALI might be taking it for granted that a 
defendant must be morally responsible for what she does if she is to be 
punished for her conduct and that in most cases in which she has control over 
her conduct she is morally responsible for what she does. 
5
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turns on an agent’s control over her conduct but (b) an agent’s 
control over her conduct has nothing to do with her moral 
responsibility for her conduct.  That is, assume that an agent’s 
moral responsibility for her conduct has nothing to do with the 
ALI’s rationale behind the fundamental predicate for criminal 
liability.11  Perhaps the important thing for the ALI is that 
sufficiently-controlled conduct is required to justify imposing 
legal punishment, as opposed to: (i) some kind of non-conduct, 
such as a status12 or mere thought,13 over which the defendant 
has less control or (ii) behavior such as a tic or seemingly goal-
oriented yet unconscious behavior,14 over which the defendant 
 
11. To emphasize, this is just a working assumption.  It is not my goal to 
offer the best interpretation of what the ALI’s view is. 
12. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).  In Robinson, the 
Court held that “a state law which imprisons a person [addicted to narcotics] 
as a criminal, even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the 
State or been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 667.  
In reaching this holding, the Court stressed that the statute at issue made “the 
‘status’ of narcotic addiction a criminal offense, for which the offender may be 
prosecuted ‘at any time before he reforms.’”  Id. at 666. 
13. There are rationales for not criminalizing thoughts that do not 
emphasize the agent’s degree of control over her own thoughts.  For example, 
even if the agent had the same type and degree of control over her thoughts 
that she had over her voluntary actions, it would be impermissible to 
criminalize thoughts because of her right to freedom of thought.  “There is 
something objectionable about criminalizing thoughts alone.  Prohibitions on 
thoughts are intrusive violations of privacy, efforts at mind control, and 
inconsistent with the goals and role of a liberal state.”  Yaffe, supra note 2, at 
175. 
14. In People v. Newton, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394 (Ct. App. 1970), the defendant 
appealed his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, arguing that during the 
time that he shot his victim, he was not conscious because he himself was in 
an altered state caused by having been shot in the abdomen.  The conviction 
was reversed.  Id. at 415.  An expert witness testified that the defendant could 
have been in a “reflex shock condition” in which the defendant unconsciously 
engaged in complex goal-oriented behavior usually indicative of conscious 
action.  Id. at 403.  Central to the reversal was that: 
 
The difference between . . . diminished capacity and 
unconsciousness . . . is one of degree only:  where the former 
provides a “partial defense” by negating a specific mental 
state essential to a particular crime, the latter is a “complete 
defense” because it negates capacity to commit any crime at 
all. 
 
Id. at 405-06. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/1
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has less control.  The defendant’s moral responsibility for her 
status, thoughts, behavior, or controlled conduct is entirely 
beside the point.  Even if the ALI thought that moral 
responsibility was irrelevant to the fundamental predicate of 
criminal liability, we could, and should, ask whether such a 
position is defensible.  Even though its views are worthy of 
serious consideration, the ALI, of course, is not a primary legal 
or moral authority. 
Of the two main competing theories—utilitarianism and 
retributivism—the idea that moral responsibility is irrelevant to 
the VAR is more at home with utilitarianism.  Utilitarian 
theories do not center on the evaluation of actors as retributive 
theories do.15  Whether an actor is morally responsible for her 
conduct is central to how retributive justificatory reasons work, 
if they work at all.  But for the utilitarian, if: (i) an actor is not 
morally responsible for her conduct but (ii) nonetheless her 
conduct can be influenced by influencing her, then the VAR 
might be substantiated by appealing to, say, punishment’s 
deterrent effects.  The basic utilitarian idea would be that for a 
criminal defendant, or anyone, to be deterred from acting a 
certain way, she must be in sufficient control of her conduct, 
even if she bears no moral responsibility for her conduct.16 
 
15. See infra Part II for an elaboration on the focus of utilitarian theories 
on evaluating actions on the basis of their consequences instead of focusing on 
evaluating actors. 
16. Of course, this sort of utilitarian approach has its own challenges to 
overcome.  For example, a utilitarian might try to justify the VAR by arguing 
that: 
 
Those who only wish and fantasize criminal acts, but don’t 
actually do them, aren’t dangerous; those whose 
(involuntary) clumsiness cause[s] others harm aren’t 
deterrable; etc.  Yet it is not obvious that these 
generalizations hold.  Mightn’t ‘accident-prone’ individuals 
be dangerous, and thus subject to preventative detention on 
utilitarian grounds?  Mightn’t such classes of individuals be 
somewhat deterrable, a least to the extent that they could 
take some precautions against their dangerous tendencies?  
And even if they themselves are not deterrable, mightn’t the 
criminal law gain an increment of general deterrence by 
making such persons liable anyway, because then those 
voluntarily causing harm will know that there is no 
possibility of pretending to have involuntarily caused it? 
 
7
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The retributivist does not rely on this idea.  Instead, the 
basic retributivist idea is that someone should be punished 
because she deserves it.  Does the criminal defendant’s desert 
warrant punishment, and if so, how much?  Any retributivist 
attempt to justify the VAR must address how the VAR helps 
insulate those who are not morally responsible for their conduct, 
and therefore lack desert, from criminal liability.17 
Consider the following: (i) a necessary condition for an 
actor’s desert is that she conduct herself in some way and be 
morally responsible for that conduct; (ii) a necessary condition 
for an actor to be morally responsible for her conduct is that she 
have the right sort of control over her conduct; (iii) a necessary 
condition for an actor to have the right sort of control over her 
conduct is that agent causalism be true; therefore, (iv) a 
necessary condition for an actor’s desert is that agent causalism 
be true.  Since a criminal defendant’s desert is the central idea 
of retributivist justifications, including any such justification of 
the VAR, for retributivist justifications of the VAR to be 
plausible, agent causalism must be true.  That is the kernel of 
this article’s argument for its main thesis. 
After presenting the argument for the main thesis, I shall 
spend considerable space examining whether agent causalism is 
coherent and plausible.  As previously explained, the 
significance of the main thesis turns in part on whether agent 
causalism is contentious, and to be contentious agent causalism 
must be coherent and at least somewhat plausible.  I shall also 
apply an agent-causal retributivist approach to justifying the 
VAR to three categories of non-paradigmatic cases.  The goal will 
 
MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS 
IMPLICATION FOR CRIMINAL LAW 47 1993) [hereinafter MOORE, ACT AND CRIME]. 
17. I am not suggesting that according to retributivist theories the VAR 
must shoulder the entire burden of shielding those not morally responsible 
from criminal liability.  For example, a retributivist might think that much of 
that burden is borne by the MPC’s culpability requirements or by Article 4.  
For example, Model Penal Code § 4.01(1) absolves an actor of criminal liability 
for his conduct if “at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or 
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality . . . of 
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.”  Also, note 
that according to standard retributivist theories, desert is not merely 
necessary for punishment.  It is also sufficient.  In connection with justifying 
the VAR, however, the part of retributivism that is particularly relevant is the 
view that desert is necessary for punishment. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/1
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be to bolster the credibility of agent-causal retributivism by 
showing how it yields defensible results even in hard cases.  
More specifically, the remainder of this paper proceeds as 
follows: 
In Part II, I explain that a defensible retributivist theory 
requires that for someone to deserve legal punishment, she must 
conduct herself in some way and be morally responsible for that 
conduct.  I do this by distinguishing utilitarian theories from 
retributivist theories and then elaborating the key retributivist 
notion of desert in light of those distinctions.  In Part III, I 
examine what sort of control over her own conduct would be 
necessary for someone to be morally responsible for her conduct, 
and therefore to deserve legal punishment for it.  I do this by 
discussing two related problems concerning moral responsibility 
and control over what one does—the problem of moral luck and 
the problem of free will.  In Part IV, I present agent causalism 
as a view that affords actors the sort of control necessary for 
moral responsibility.  To substantiate my claim that agent 
causalism is contentious, I argue that agent causalism is 
coherent and at least somewhat plausible, even though I do not 
attempt a thorough defense of agent causalism.  In Part V, I 
continue to argue that agent causalism is plausible.  Drawing 
heavily on the work of others, I sketch a picture of how agents 
fit into voluntary actions resulting from practical deliberation to 
explain how, according to agent causalism, the way that agents 
voluntarily act might be responsive to practical reasons.  In Part 
VI, I bolster the contention that agent causalism is plausible by 
showing how it might aid the retributivist in regard to three 
sorts of cases in which the VAR is implicated—cases involving 
complex unconscious conduct, cases involving crimes of 
omission, and cases involving habitual conduct.  I conclude with 
some brief summarizing remarks. 
 
II. Desert Requires Moral Responsibility for Voluntary Action 
 
As mentioned above, there are two dominant types of 
justifications of legal punishment—utilitarian and retributivist.  
A normatively important question regarding punishment is: 
“what justifies the state in inflicting hard treatment on people 
for their supposed or claimed wrongdoing with the intention that 
9
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that treatment cause the supposed or claimed wrongdoer to 
suffer?”18  When the state punishes, it purposely inflicts 
suffering upon the defendant.  In a case where a defendant is 
found not guilty of murder by reason of insanity, he may be 
confined to an institution to protect the public.  And his 
confinement might cause him to suffer.  But the point of 
confining him is not to inflict suffering upon him.19  Because 
legal punishment, in contrast, purposely, not just knowingly, 
inflicts suffering, the call for its justification is especially 
exigent. 
 
A. Utilitarian Theories of Punishment 
 
Utilitarian20 theories of punishment center on the effects of 
punitive practices and decisions on the well-being of individuals 
in society—criminal defendants included.21  They are 
 
18. Mitchell N. Berman, The Justification of Punishment, in THE 
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 141, 143 (Andrei Marmor 
ed., 2012). 
19. See DAVID BOONIN, THE PROBLEM OF PUNISHMENT 13 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2008) (“In [confining him], the state recognizes that its action will 
seriously harm the [defendant], but harming him is not its intention.  Its 
intention is merely to protect the public, and it would lock him up even if this 
did not harm him.”). 
20. Technically, utilitarianism is committed to specific ways of 
amalgamating utilities when assessing the value of a state of affairs.  The 
utilitarian either takes the sum of individual utilities (classical utilitarianism) 
or the average of individual utilities (average utilitarianism) in computing a 
numerical representation of the value of a situation—that situation’s amount 
of social welfare.  I intend my claims about a utilitarian approach to justifying 
punishment to carry over to any welfarist approach that is committed to 
consequentialism.  Welfarism is the view that the only features of a state of 
affairs that determine the state’s intrinsic value are, collectively, the state’s 
utility information (i.e., a pairing of each individual in a situation with her 
utility in that situation). 
21. The central utilitarian idea has been expressed in a number of ways.  
See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CRIMINAL LAW 14 (5th ed. 2009) (“according to classical 
utilitarianism . . . the purpose of all laws is to maximize the net happiness of 
society.  Laws should be used to exclude, as far as possible, all painful and 
unpleasant events . . . . [B]oth crime and punishment are unpleasant . . . . [T]he 
pain inflicted by punishment is justifiable if, but only if, it is expected to result 
in a reduction in the pain of crime that would otherwise occur.”); TEN, supra 
note 4, at 3 (“The utilitarian theory justifies punishment solely in terms of its 
beneficial effects or consequences . . . . [U]ltimately the only morally significant 
features of an act are the good and bad consequences produced by it.  A right 
act is that which, among the available alternatives, produces the best 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/1
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consequentialist theories.  According to consequentialism, only 
the consequences of implementing feasible options are relevant 
to what choices morally ought to be made.22  “[C]onsequentialism 
is the doctrine that the moral value of any action always lies in 
its consequences, and that it is by reference to their 
consequences that actions . . . are to be justified if they are to be 
justified at all.”23  A consequentialist does not merely aver that 
consequences are of primary moral importance.  She claims that 
only consequences are morally relevant to choice.  Thus, a non-
consequentialist might consistently think that the consequences 
of feasible alternatives are always very important moral 
considerations.  As John Rawls emphasizes, it is a mistake to 
think that non-consequentialist theories “characterize the 
rightness of institutions and acts independently from their 
consequences.  All ethical doctrines worth our attention take 
 
consequences.”); LLOYD L.WEINREB, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENT, 
QUESTIONS 327 (7th ed. 2003) (“punishment is justified by its utility, the good 
that it does, not necessarily for the criminal himself but for the community.”). 
22. It is possible for a theorist to be a consequentialist when it comes to 
justifying punishment without being a consequentialist tout court: 
 
Because it is customary to classify moral theories . . . as either 
consequentialist or deontological, it is tempting to suppose 
that consequentialist theories of punishment must be 
committed to a consequentialist ethic . . . . However, the 
mapping of consequentialist theories of punishment onto 
consequentialist moral theories is too facile . . . . 
Consequentialism in punishment theory is a view regarding 
how the intentional infliction of suffering for wrongdoing can 
be morally justified; it is not a view about value or right 
action more generally. 
 
Berman, supra note 18, at 144. 
  Of course, anyone who is a consequentialist vis-à-vis punishment but who 
denies consequentialism with respect to the evaluation of other important 
social choices presumably has reasons for the discontinuous nature of her 
approach.  And it would be fair to ask such a theorist what those reasons are.  
For example, why be a consequentialist when it comes to justifying legal 
punishment but not be a consequentialist when it comes to, say, justifying one 
particular redistributive tax-and-transfer regime over others?  Putting this 
aside, since I am discussing only theories of legal punishment, I shall assume 
that the possibility of a fair weather consequentialist does not impugn the 
details of my characterization of a utilitarian theory of punishment as a type 
of consequentialist theory of punishment. 
23. Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM: 
FOR AND AGAINST 75, 79 (J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams ed., 1973). 
11
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consequences into account in judging rightness.  One which did 
not would simply be irrational, crazy.”24 
Of particular significance for this paper, “a central idea of 
consequentialism [and therefore of utilitarianism] is that the 
only kind of thing that has intrinsic value is a state of affairs, 
and that anything else that has value has it because it conduces 
to some intrinsically valuable state of affairs.”25  For a 
consequentialist, consequences are all that ever ultimately 
matter morally, and consequences are states of affairs.26  The 
deontic status27 of a social, or individual,  choice depends on the 
comparative intrinsic values of the states of affairs that would 
be brought about by the options that are feasible for society, or 
the individual, at the time of choice.  For this reason, the 
criminal defendant is not the central object of normative 
assessment for utilitarian justifications of punishment.  The 
utilitarian takes an ex ante point of view—the social choices (a) 
to adopt a particular system of criminal punishment and (b) to 
impose, under that system, a certain amount of legal 
punishment upon a particular defendant are to be justified by 
the consequences of doing so.  If the consequences of such choices 
are better than those of any feasible alternatives, then we should 
make those particular choices—our legally punishing in that 
way is justified. 
An obvious potentially beneficial effect of legal punishment 
is crime reduction.  Accordingly, it is common for utilitarian 
analysts to focus on various ways that punishment reduces 
crime when they offer justifications for legal punishment.  
 
24. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 30 (Harvard Univ. Press 1971).  
This is not to deny that a non-consequentialist of an extreme sort might think 
that the consequences of feasible options are always irrelevant to moral choice.  
Such a view is one possible type of non-consequentialist view.  (In my opinion, 
such an extreme form of non-consequentialism is very implausible.)  But to 
reiterate the main point, it is a misunderstanding to think that non-
consequentialists characteristically do not consider consequences to be 
important, morally relevant factors when making social choices. 
25. Williams, supra note 23, at 83. 
26. Informally, one might say that a consequence is a type of situation—
a situation that results from or is the outcome of an action or choice—such as 
the choice to imprison Fred for five years or the choice not to impose criminal 
liability upon Linda or the choice to abolish all strict liability crimes. 
27. For example, morally permissible, morally forbidden, and morally 
required. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/1
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Publically punishing Fred for committing a crime is justified 
because it reduces crime by scaring people into not committing 
it (general deterrence); punishing Fred for committing a crime is 
justified because the horrible experience of being punished will 
scare Fred into not committing future crimes (specific 
deterrence); punishing Fred for committing a crime is justified 
because punishing him improves his character so that he will 
not commit future crimes (rehabilitation); punishing Fred for 
committing a crime by incarcerating him is justified because 
incarcerating him prevents him from committing future crimes, 
at least for as long as he remains incarcerated.28 
Notice that the thing that the utilitarian promotes in the 
previous paragraph is always a situation with less crime going 
on in it.  Of course, utilitarians care, often a lot, about certain 
features of agents—for example, whether Fred is dangerous, 
how well-off Fred or anyone else would be under various 
circumstances, and so forth.  And a utilitarian might even think, 
in some derivative sense, that such features have moral or 
ethical29 significance.  But the only type of thing that has any 
intrinsic moral/ethical value for a utilitarian is a situation.  For 
the utilitarian, there are primarily two types of things that get 
morally/ethically assessed—choices, actions, and outcomes.  The 
assessment of a choice, as permissible, impermissible, etc., 
depends on a prior assessment of the intrinsic moral/ethical 
value of its outcome.  And for a utilitarian, the moral/ethical 
value of an outcome is a function solely of the utilities of the 
individuals, including the criminal offenders, in30 that outcome. 
 
28.  Of course, crime reduction need not be the only potentially welfare-
enhancing consequence that a utilitarian theorist of legal punishment focuses 
on.  For example, if we assume a preference-satisfaction interpretation of 
individual utility, then, if enough persons have a stable preference that 
offenders receive what might be considered their just deserts, then legally 
punishing in a certain way might significantly increase individual utilities, 
and therefore increase social welfare.  See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven 
Shavell, The Fairness of Sanctions: Some Implications for Optimal 
Enforcement Policy, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 223 (2000).   
29. Some may try to distinguish the concepts expressed by terms such as 
moral, morality, and morally from the concepts expressed by terms such as 
ethical, ethics, and ethically.  This article does not draw such distinctions. 
30. To say that Fred is in a state of affairs (or situation, or outcome) is to 
say that if that state of affairs were actual, then Fred would exist.  And Fred’s 
utility in an outcome refers to how well-off Fred would be if that outcome were 
to come to pass.  This article will not consider how defensible a standard 
13
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B. Retributivist Theories of Punishment 
 
Retributivists, in contrast, do not primarily focus on good or 
bad consequences.  For a standard sort of retributivist, the moral 
assessment of agents—the criminal defendants themselves—
plays a primary role.  As explained, even if a utilitarian morally 
evaluates agents, that evaluation is secondary to the intrinsic 
moral/ethical value of realized states of affairs and the derived 
evaluation of choices that lead to them.  The moral feature of an 
agent that retributivist theories focus on is her desert.31  And an 
agent’s desert is conceptually connected to voluntary wrongful 
conduct, since “retributive theories of punishment . . . maintain 
that punishment is justified because the offender has voluntarily 
committed a morally wrong act.”32 
 
utilitarian or welfare-economic view of the nature of individual well-being is. 
31. TEN, supra note 4, at 46 (“Contemporary retributivists treat the notion 
of desert as central to the retributive theory, punishment being justified in 
terms of the desert of the offender.”). 
32. Id.  The central retributivist idea has been expressed in a number of 
ways.  See id. at 5 (“Retributivists regard the offender’s wrongdoing as 
deserving of punishment, and the amount of punishment should be 
proportionate to the extent of wrongdoing.  The offender’s desert, and not the 
beneficial consequences of punishment, is what justifies punishment”);  
Anthony Duff, Legal Punishment, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF  
PHILOSOPHY (2001) [hereinafter Duff, Legal Punishment], 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment/ (“The guilty, those who 
commit criminal offences, deserve to be punished: which is to say . . . not merely 
that we must not punish the innocent, or punish the guilty more than they 
deserve, but that we should punish the guilty, to the extent that they deserve: 
penal desert constitutes not just a necessary, but an in principle sufficient 
reason for punishment.”); MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF 
THE CRIMINAL LAW 153 (Oxford Univ. Press 1997) [hereinafter MOORE, PLACING 
BLAME] (“[R]etributivism is the view that we ought to punish offenders because 
and only because they deserve to be punished.  Punishment is justified, for a 
retributivist, solely by the fact that those receiving it deserve it.”); WEINREB, 
supra note 21, at 327 (“[P]unishment is retribution for the wrong done by the 
criminal;  it is retrospective, a requirement of justice justified directly and 
completely by the past conduct of the person punished . . . . Not only does 
retribution justify punishment; it prohibits a relaxation of punishment in order 
to accomplish some social good.”). 
  One of the better known illustrations of the “non-relaxation” aspect of 
retributivism comes from Kant: 
 
[W]hoever has committed murder, must die . . . . Even if a 
civil society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of all 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/1
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Retributivism is not just an academic theory.  It is operative 
in legal opinions as well.  To offer a couple of high-profile 
examples: In Enmund v. Florida,33 Earl Enmund was sentenced 
to death as an accomplice to felony murder.34  Enmund had not 
killed anyone.35  Nor did the original plan include killing 
anyone.36  Enmund appealed his sentence to the Court, which 
reversed, barring Florida from executing him.37  In reversing 
Enmund’s death sentence, the Court reasoned: 
 
Here the robbers did commit murder; but they 
were subjected to the death penalty only because 
they killed as well as robbed.  The question before 
us is not the disproportionality of death as a 
penalty for murder, but rather the validity of 
capital punishment for Enmund’s own conduct.  
The focus must be on his culpability, not on that 
of those who committed the robbery and shot the 
victims, for we insist on “individualized 
consideration as a constitutional requirement in 
imposing the death sentence” . . . .  Enmund did 
not kill or intend to kill and thus his culpability is 
plainly different from that of the robbers who 
killed; yet the State treated them alike and 
attributed to Enmund the culpability of those who 
killed the [victims].  This was impermissible 
under the Eighth Amendment.38 
 
its members . . . the last murderer lying in prison ought to be 
executed before the resolution was carried out.  This ought to 
be done in order that every one may realize the desert of his 
deeds, and that blood-guiltiness may not remain upon the 
people; for otherwise they might all be regarded as 
participators in the murder as a public violation of justice. 
 
IMMANUEL KANT, THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT, The Right of Punishing  
and of Pardoning § E(I) (W. Hastie trans., 2003) (1790), 
http://xet.es/books/Kant/The%20Science%20of%20Right%20Kant.pdf. 
33. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
34. The underlying felony was an armed robbery.  Id. at 784-85. 
35. Id. at 784. 
36. See generally id. 
37. Id. at 801. 
38. Id. at 798 (citations omitted). 
15
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Although Enmund was guilty of felony murder, it was 
impermissible to execute him for that crime because, unlike the 
others who shot and killed the crime victims, Enmund’s desert 
did not warrant that severe a punishment.  His culpability was 
insufficient. 
In Atkins v. Virginia,39 Daryl Atkins was sentenced to death 
for capital murder and appealed his sentence to the Court, which 
reversed.40  The Court agreed with Atkins’s argument; because 
he was mentally retarded, he could not be lawfully sentenced to 
death.41  The Court took note of how a consensus among states 
to disallow the execution of mentally retarded defendants 
“unquestionably reflect[ed] widespread judgment about the 
relative culpability of mentally retarded offenders, and the 
relationship between mental retardation and the penological 
purposes served by the death penalty.”42  And the Court agreed 
that, while mentally retarded defendants’ “deficiencies do not 
warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions . . . they do 
diminish their personal culpability.”43  Further: 
 
With respect to retribution—the interest in seeing 
that the offender gets his “just deserts”—the 
severity of the appropriate punishment 
necessarily depends on the culpability of the 
offender. . . . [O]ur jurisprudence has consistently 
confined the imposition of the death penalty to a 
narrow category of the most serious crimes.  
. . . If the culpability of the average murderer is 
insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction 
available to the State, the lesser culpability of the 
mentally retarded offender surely does not merit 
that form of retribution.44 
 
Thus, one significant reason why the Court forbade the 
 
39. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
40. Id. at 321. 
41. See generally id. 
42. Id. at 317. 
43. Id. at 318. 
44. Id. at 319. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/1
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execution of Atkins was that Atkins could not have had the 
culpability necessary to deserve death for his crime. 
As previously mentioned, the retributivist is interested 
primarily in a defendant’s desert.  Before elaborating the notion 
of desert more fully, I should point out that what I take to be a 
standard retributivist theory is not a form of consequentialism 
that focuses on minimizing the number of persons who fail to be 
punished as they deserve to be.45  Unlike utilitarianism’s moral 
rationality, the standard moral rationality of retributivism is 
neither minimizing nor maximizing.  To illustrate one type of 
consequentialist theory that I wish to distinguish from what I 
take to be a more standard retributivist view, I would like to 
consider a particular welfare-economic critique of setting the 
level of punishment for a certain crime on the basis of the 
retributively fair level.46  The gist of the critique is that the 
retributivist adopts a way of assessing the outcomes of 
competing legal and policy choices that tends to recommend 
choices leading to inferior outcomes, even as those outcomes are 
evaluated by retributivist lights.  The consequentialist 
retributivist favorably ranks outcomes in which punishments 
are properly proportioned to the retributively fair level to fit the 
crimes committed.  Such outcomes are rated higher than other 
outcomes in which punishments are more severe and widely 
publicized and thereby manage to scare potential criminals 
enough that no crimes are committed.  That is, when the 
retributively fair punishment is selected, some undeterred 
people will commit crimes, and many will get away with them.  
Such individuals go unpunished and are therefore treated 
unfairly—they do not get what they deserve: 
 
 
45. According to this type of consequentialist theory, if someone deserves 
no punishment and is not punished at all, then she is punished as she deserves 
to be (viz., not at all).  So this form of retributive consequentialism would 
consider a society in which there was no crime and no punishment to be ideally 
minimizing (though there would be other ideally minimizing possibilities).  
Also, to fail to be punished as one deserves to be, one is either punished more 
severely or less severely than one deserves to be.  For example, someone who 
deserves a little punishment but is not punished at all is not punished as she 
deserves to be. 
46. See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 
320–29 (Harv Univ. Press 2002). 
17
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It is peculiar . . . for retributivists to insist that the 
sanction should not exceed the fair ideal . . . 
regardless of how much unfairness results with 
regard to those who go scot-free . . . . [U]nder the 
unfair sanction [that deters], no one . . . receives 
unfair treatment. Therefore, when one considers 
the unfairness surrounding the punishment of all 
the criminals who commit the wrongful act when 
the sanction is [fair], one should be troubled. The 
[retributive] fairness view, on its own terms, 
seems erroneously constrained as it only considers 
the [] individuals who are caught and ignores . . . 
[those] who are not.47 
 
This critique may pose a problem for a type of retributivist 
who emphasizes the comparative evaluation of outcomes on the 
basis, a least in part, of how much unjust-because-undeserved 
punishment is realized in the outcomes being compared.48  But 
such a retributivist does not hold what I take a more standard 
sort of retributivist theory to be, especially in regard to how to 
justify the imposition of a certain amount of punishment upon a 
particular individual on the basis of what he or she has done.  
What I understand to be a more standard retributivist view does 
not focus on maximizing the value of outcomes in the way the 
consequentialist retributivist view targeted by the critique does. 
A more standard retributivist view49 also justifies 
 
47. Id. at 325. 
48. As explained, to be saddled with the problem that the critique poses, 
the consequentialist retributivist would also need to rank situations higher 
when the general levels of punishment are set to the retributively fair level.  
This sort of retributivist might be able to escape the charge that her position 
is erroneous on its own terms if she is prepared to explain how two different 
properties of outcomes—(1) the fairness of general levels of punishment and 
(2) the amount of unjust because undeserved punishment—are to be traded off 
against one another under the chosen retributive social welfare function.  If 
she can do this, then it might turn out that her theory consistently provides a 
high ranking to situations in which there is a lot of unjust because undeserved 
punishment, as long as such situations feature general criminal penalties that 
are extremely fair.  Of course, the price that the retributivist might need to pay 
to take this tack is that her weighting of the two different (retributive) fairness-
based properties under the proposed social welfare function would be 
extremely implausible. 
49. From here on, only a more standard non-consequentialist view will be 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/1
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punishment on the basis of desert, but in a different way.  When 
assessing whether legally to punish a defendant and how much 
to punish her, the retributivist focuses on whether she, the 
agent, deserves punishment and if so, then how much.  Although 
judging what an agent deserves is a way of judging the agent 
herself, what the agent does also plays an indispensable role: 
 
If a person is deserving of some sort of treatment, 
he must, necessarily, be so in virtue of some 
possessed characteristic or prior activity.  It is 
because no one can deserve anything unless there 
is some basis or ostensible occasion for the desert 
that judgments of desert carry with them a 
commitment to the giving of reasons.  One cannot 
say, for example, that Jones deserves gratitude 
although he has done “nothing in particular.” If a 
person says that Jones deserves gratitude, then 
he must be prepared to answer the question “For 
what?”  Of course, he may not know the basis of 
Jones’s desert, but if he denies that there is any 
basis, then he has forfeited his right to use the 
terminology of desert.  He can still say that we 
ought to treat Jones well for “no reason in 
particular” of simply “for the sake of being nice,” 
but it is absurd to say that Jones deserves good 
treatment for no reason in particular.  Desert 
without a basis is simply not desert.50 
 
Assertions of desert have an implicit structure: “‘S deserves 
X in virtue of F,’ where S is a person, X is a mode of treatment, 
and F [is] some fact about S. . . .”51  Further, if X is legal 
punishment, then F, the fact about S, must be a fact about 
something S did.52  F cannot be a fact about S’s status or about 
S’s mere thoughts or feelings.  The government should not 
 
considered. 
50. Joel Feinberg, Justice and Personal Desert, in DOING AND DESERVING: 
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 55, 58 (Princeton Univ. Press 1970) 
[hereinafter Feinberg, Justice and Personal Desert]. 
51. Id. at 61. 
52. Here I am glossing over the act/omission distinction. 
19
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punish people merely because they have villainous characters or 
evil thoughts.53  To say that A deserves a certain amount of legal 
punishment is to assess A herself, but, of conceptual necessity, 
only in reference to something that A does.54  A’s performing an 
act in reference to which a desert-assessment of A coherently can 
be made is a conceptually necessary condition for A’s desert.  It 
is this feature of retributivism that suggests a natural type of 
justification of the VAR: (Of course the VAR is justified: (a) legal 
punishment is justified by desert, and (b) deserving punishment 
is incoherent except in light of something that the criminal 
defendant did.) 
Any complete justification of the VAR must address not only 
the necessity of an act but also the voluntariness of that act.  
What is the word “voluntary” doing in MPC § 2.01?55  Why 
include it?  What, if anything, does it add?  As mentioned 
previously, the ALI thinks that the term “voluntary” serves at 
least to emphasize an agent’s control over her behavior.56  And if 
a theory’s main justificatory notion for legal punishment is a 
criminal defendant’s desert, then, under that theory, the most 
natural reason to think that control is important is that it makes 
possible a defendant’s moral responsibility for her conduct.  For 
a defendant to deserve legal punishment for what she did, she 
must be morally responsible for what she did.  And moral 
responsibility requires sufficient control. 
Although desert requires moral responsibility, which in 
turn requires sufficient control, some retributivists argue that a 
defendant’s desert can turn in part on factors over which the 
defendant lacks control.  In addition to holding that a voluntary 
 
53. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 cmt. 1 (Official Draft and Explanatory 
Notes 1985) (“It is fundamental that a civilized society does not punish for 
thoughts alone.”);  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 explanatory note on subsection 
(1) (“a fundamental predicate for all criminal liability [is] that the guilt of the 
defendant be based upon conduct, and that the conduct include a voluntary act 
or an omission to perform an act of which the defendant was physically capable. 
. . . [L]iability cannot be based upon mere thoughts, upon physical conditions, 
or upon involuntary movements.”). 
54. Here, I am ignoring the act/omission distinction and the point that an 
omission can (under a broadly retributivist scheme) be the basis of an agent’s 
deserving punishment. 
55. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (1962). 
56. See supra Part I. 
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act is necessary for desert, some57 retributivists argue that when 
an agent voluntarily acts, that agent’s desert can be 
conceptualized as a function of two elements—culpability and 
wrongdoing.58  Culpability is a function of the mens rea, purpose, 
knowledge, recklessness, negligence, that accompanies the act.59  
Wrongdoing is a function of the badness of the results of the act. 
For example, Abbott and Costello both recklessly drive 
automobiles in a busy part of town.  By happenstance, Abbott 
manages not to hit anyone, barely missing Lewis, a pedestrian. 
But Costello hits a pedestrian, Clark.  Abbott is less deserving 
of punishment than Costello,60 even though both are equally 
culpable, for Abbott committed less wrongdoing than Costello.  
Another example: Abbott negligently drives a car and 
unintentionally hits and kills Lewis, a pedestrian.  Costello 
intentionally sets out to kill a pedestrian, Clark, and 
purposefully drives right at Clark, hitting and killing Clark.  
 
57. Some retributivists focus only on culpability and argue that 
wrongdoing has no independent moral relevance to an agent’s desert.  For 
example: 
 
I propose to consider what to make of a doctrine of the 
criminal law that seems to me not rationally supportable  
. . . . This is the doctrine—the harm doctrine, I’ll call it—that 
reduces punishment for intentional wrongdoers (and often 
precludes punishment for negligent and reckless wrongdoers) 
if by chance the harm they intended or risked does not occur. 
 
Sanford H. Kadish, Supreme Court Review: Foreword: The Criminal Law and 
the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 679 (1994). 
58. Note that wrongdoing here is being used in a technical sense.  The 
term does not refer simply to the performance of a wrongful action.  As will be 
elaborated, wrongdoing refers to the badness of the results of what the 
defendant does—worse outcomes mean greater wrongdoing.  See MOORE, 
PLACING BLAME, supra note 32, at 191 (“both culpability and wrongdoing 
matter to one’s just deserts . . . . [T]here are two independent desert-bases, 
wrongdoing and culpability. . . . [T]o ask what punishment someone deserves 
is to ask how much wrong they did, and with what culpability they did the 
wrong.”). 
59. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (“Minimum Requirements of Culpability 
. . . . [A] person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, 
recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material 
element of the offense.”). 
60. Here I leave open whether less deserving of punishment refers to 
whether Abbott is to be punished at all or to whether Abbott is to be punished 
less severely than Costello. 
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Abbott is less deserving of punishment than Costello, even 
though both have committed the same amount of wrongdoing, 
for Abbott is less culpable than Costello. 
Michael Moore has elaborated and defended the idea that 
culpability and wrongdoing are independent desert-bases.61  And 
he has clarified how the relationship between desert and 
culpability differs from the relationship between desert and 
wrongdoing.  Assuming a voluntary act, culpability is both 
necessary and sufficient for desert.  If an agent acts culpably, 
then the agent deserves some legal punishment.  If an agent does 
not act culpably, then the agent does not deserve any legal 
punishment, even if the consequences of the act are really bad.  
On the other hand, wrongdoing is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for desert.  For example, someone might deserve legal 
punishment for committing an inchoate crime that did not, 
because it was inchoate, generate any particularly harmful 
results.  Or someone voluntarily but non-culpably might do 
something very harmful.  In the latter case, a well-constituted 
agent would likely feel regret, but she would not deserve legal 
punishment.  However, if an agent is culpable and, therefore, 
deserving of some punishment, then the amount of punishment 
deserved is in part a function of wrongdoing.  Wrongdoing takes 
on independent significance, but only in the presence of 
culpability, whereas culpability always has independent 
significance on its own. 
To summarize: According to retributivism, the justification 
of punishment turns on the defendant’s desert.  A defendant can 
have desert only if she performs an act over which she has the 
right sort of control to make her morally responsible for that act.  
In addition, she must be culpable in performing the act—that is, 
she must have done it purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or 
negligently.62  Finally, assuming that she is culpable, her degree 
 
61. See MOORE, PLACING BLAME, supra note 32, at 191–93. 
62. Someone might object that strict liability crimes have no mens rea 
(culpability) requirement and that therefore a defendant who committed a 
strict liability crime could not deserve punishment for having committed it.  
However: 
 
There are two ways to construe strict liability crimes: (1) the 
crime has no mens rea requirements; or (2) the crime has 
mens rea requirements but any mental state on the part of 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/1
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of desert can be affected by the badness of the results of her 
conduct. 
 
III. The Problem of Moral Luck, the Problem of Free Will, and 
the Principle of Alternate Possibilities 
 
As explained, according to the ALI, the VAR requires a 
voluntary act to assure that the criminal defendant has the 
requisite sort or amount of control over her conduct to legitimize 
imposing criminal responsibility upon her for that conduct.  And 
central to retributivist justifications is the idea that this control 
must be sufficient to ground moral responsibility.  To identify 
and elaborate the sort of control necessary to ground moral 
responsibility, it is helpful to consider two related problems—
the problem of moral luck and the problem of free will. 
 
A. The Problem of Moral Luck 
 
Luck and control are tightly related.  Luck can come into 
play when control is absent.  Games of chance, involving random 
events not within anyone’s control, require luck for success.  
Games like chess also can involve luck when something is not 
within a player’s control.  (I’m lucky that my opponent did not 
notice that devastating move during her turn at that point in the 
game.  If she had, then I would have been checkmated within 
three moves.  Instead, I went on to win.)  That luck and lacking 
control are connected should not be confused with the stronger, 
arguably false, claim that luck is present in all cases in which 
there is a lack of control.  For example, “[a]n event such as the 
rising of the sun this morning was entirely out of one’s control, 
yet it is not at all clear that one is lucky the sun rose this 
 
the defendant meets them.  To conceive of strict liability in 
the first way is to see strict liability crimes as involving a 
major departure from fundamental axioms of criminal law, 
particularly the principle according to which acts are never 
worthy of punishment in the absence of accompaniment by 
culpable mental states. 
 
Yaffe, supra note 2, at 188–89.  Conceptualizing strict liability crimes in the 
second way enables a response to the objection by respecting the fundamental 
axiom.  Id. 
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morning, although it is surely a good thing that it did.”63  So if A 
has enough of the right kind of control over a situation, then how 
things turn out vis-à-vis A is not a matter of luck.  But also, 
sometimes how things turn out vis-à-vis A is not a matter of luck 
even when A lacks control over a situation. 
Additionally, it seems extremely plausible that how morally 
to assess A should depend only on factors that are, at least in 
some manner and to no small degree, under A’s control.  
Whether A is morally responsible for a choice depends, at least 
in large part, on whether things are really up to A when A acts 
or chooses.  Luck is not supposed to have anything to do with 
it.64  To the extent that the results of what A does are not up to 
A, those results are not relevant to whether a given moral 
assessment of A65 is correct.66  This idea generates the problem 
 
63. Andrew Latus, Moral Luck, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(last visited March 19, 2016), http://www.iep.utm.edu/moralluc/. 
64. Feinberg, Problematic Responsibilities in Law and Morals, in DOING 
& DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 32 (Princeton Univ. 
Press 1970) (“Moral responsibility . . . must be something one can neither 
escape by good luck nor tumble into through bad luck.”). 
65. This should not be confused with the view that the results of A’s 
choices, even when not entirely up to A, are irrelevant to the moral assessment 
of A’s choices (as permissible, morally required, morally worse than some other 
choices, and so forth).  The problem of moral luck is a problem that arises when 
assessing agents, not their choices. 
 Also, this idea threatens the notion that wrongdoing is relevant to desert.  The 
problem of moral luck motivates some retributivists to conceptualize desert as 
a function of voluntariness and culpability only.  Such retributivists might 
argue, for example, that attempted murder should be punished as severely as 
murder when luck intervenes to render the attempted murder inchoate and 
the mens rea is the same in both cases. 
66. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 8 
(Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1784).  
 
A good will is not good because of what it effects or 
accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed 
end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself 
. . . . Even if, by a special disfavor of fortune or by the 
niggardly provision of a step motherly nature, this will 
should wholly lack the capacity to carry out its purpose—if 
with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing and 
only the good will were left (not, of course, as a mere wish but 
as the summoning of all means insofar as they are in our 
control)—then, like a jewel, it would still shine by itself, as 
something that has its full worth in itself. Usefulness or 
fruitlessness can neither add anything to this worth nor take 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/1
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of moral luck.  Moral luck comes into play “[w]here a significant 
aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his 
control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object 
of moral judgment.”67  The problem posed by moral luck arises 
because: (a) at least in many cases, there seems to be such a 
thing as moral luck; and (b) both of the following are plausible68 
(where “(CP)” refers to the “Control Principle” and “(ML)” refers 
to “Moral Luck”): 
 
(CP)  We are morally assessable only to the extent 
that what we are assessed for depends on factors 
under our control. 
 
(ML)  [M]oral luck occurs when an agent can be 
correctly treated as an object of moral judgment, 
despite the fact that a significant aspect of what 
he is assessed for depends on factors beyond his 
control.69 
 
An example should suffice to show why the idea that there 
can be such a thing as moral luck, as characterized by (ML), 
seems plausible to many.  Abbott shoots at Lewis, and Costello 
shoots at Clark.  Abbott’s shot is not lethal because, out of 
nowhere, Horatio intercedes to take the bullet, striking Horatio’s 
arm,  that Abbott shoots at Lewis.  Costello’s shot is unimpeded 
and strikes Clark’s head, instantly killing Clark.  Even though 
it is beyond Abbott’s and Costello’s control whether there is 
someone like Horatio lurking around ready heroically to leap out 
of nowhere to shield potential shooting victims, what Abbott 
does is not as bad as what Costello does in the sense that what 
 
anything away from it. 
 
Id. at 8. 
67. Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 24, 26 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1979). 
68. (CP) is plausible in the straightforward sense that, at least on the 
surface, it seems true.  (ML) is plausible as a definitional statement, because 
it seems accurately to articulate the concept that we have in mind when we 
speak of moral luck. 
69. Dana K. Nelkin, Moral Luck, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (rev. ed. 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-luck/. 
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Abbott is morally responsible for is not as bad as what Costello 
is morally responsible for.  Costello killed someone, but Abbott 
did not.  Costello is more blameworthy than Abbott.  Although 
both (CP) and (ML) are plausible, if there are cases of moral luck, 
then in such cases we seem faced with the contradiction that 
things beyond someone’s control both are and are not 
appropriate bases upon which to judge her morally. 
How does the problem of moral luck help identify the sort of 
control that a criminal defendant must have over her conduct for 
her to act voluntarily and, thereby, be morally responsible for 
her conduct?  The problem of moral luck seems to pose a problem 
primarily for what has been termed the harm doctrine, which 
“reduces punishment for intentional wrongdoers (and often 
precludes punishment for negligent and reckless wrongdoers) if 
by chance the harm they intended or risked does not occur.”70  
That is, the most obvious target of the problem of moral luck 
seems to be the notion that wrongdoing can influence desert.  
But other implications of the problem of moral luck come into 
view once we consider that wrongdoing is not the only element 
of desert over which a defendant might lack control. 
To see this more clearly, note that moral luck comes in at 
least four different varieties. Resultant luck, illustrated above in 
the head-shooting example, is “luck in the way things turn 
out.”71  Circumstantial luck is “luck in one’s circumstances . . . . 
 
70. Kadish, supra note 57, at 679. 
71. Nelkin, supra note 69.  Consider another example of resultant luck, 
involving a truck driver running over a child: 
 
The driver, if he is entirely without fault, will feel terrible 
about his role in the event, but will not have to reproach 
himself.  Therefore this example of agent-regret is not yet a 
case of moral bad luck.  However, if the driver was guilty of 
even a minor degree of negligence . . . then if that negligence 
contributes to the death of the child, he will not merely feel 
terrible.  He will blame himself for the death.  And what 
makes this an example of moral luck is that he would have to 
blame himself only slightly for the negligence itself if no 
situation arose which required him to brake suddenly and 
violently to avoid hitting a child.  Yet the negligence is the 
same in both cases, and the driver has no control over 
whether a child will run into his path. 
 
Nagel, supra note 67, at 28–29. 
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The things we are called upon to do, the moral tests we face, are 
importantly determined by factors beyond our control.”72  
Constitutive luck concerns “the kind of person you are, where 
this is not just a question of what you deliberately do, but of your 
inclinations, capacities, and temperament.”73  And causal luck is 
“luck in how one is determined by antecedent circumstances.”74 
Causal luck suggests that the amount of harm that a 
defendant actually causes is not the only element of desert over 
which a defendant might lack control.  As discussed, the harm 
actually caused is affected by factors external to the agent that 
the agent does not control.  It is for this reason that it seems 
questionable to many to consider wrongdoing, in the technical 
sense of the term, a variable that can affect an agent’s moral 
responsibility, and therefore her desert.  But if we limit the 
factors relevant to assessing an agent’s moral responsibility to 
those internal to the agent, then we escape the problem that 
arises from treating wrongdoing as a desert-basis.  We can 
“admit that moral responsibility for external harm makes no 
sense and argue that moral responsibility is . . . restricted to the 
inner world of the mind . . . for here is a domain where things 
happen without the consent of uncooperative nature.”75  The 
agent, after all, is in control of her own mind. 
But this strategy takes us only so far.  Joel Feinberg 
suggests an example involving two virtually identical 
aggressors—Hotspur and Witwood.  Each aggressor is imagined, 
 
72. Nagel, supra note 67, at 33. 
73. Id. at 28.  To elaborate: 
 
Since our genes, care-givers, peers, and other environmental 
influences all contribute to making us who we are (and since 
we have no control over these) it seems that who we are is at 
least largely a matter of luck.  Since how we act is partly a 
function of who we are, the existence of constitutive luck 
entails that what actions we perform depends on luck, too. 
 
 Nelkin, supra note 69. 
74. Nagel, supra note 67, at 28.  Arguably, the category of causal luck is 
superfluous “because circumstantial and constitutive luck seem to cover the 
same territory.  Constitutive luck covers what we are, while circumstantial 
luck covers what happens to us.  Nothing else seems to remain that can play a 
role in determining what we do.”  Latus, supra note 63. 
75. Feinberg, Justice and Personal Desert, supra note 50, at 33. 
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in separate incidents, to slap a victim called Hemo in the face.  
Hemo turns out to be a hemophiliac.  When Hotspur slaps Hemo 
he cuts Hemo’s mouth, and Hemo bleeds to death.  When 
Witwood strikes Hemo something external, that is, not involving 
Witwood’s mind, happens that prevents Hemo’s death.  
Comparatively speaking, Hotspur is morally unlucky because he 
is responsible for greater wrongdoing—Hemo’s death instead of 
Hemo’s nonfatal injury—than Witwood.  Witwood enjoys 
morally better fortune.  Feinberg asks us to imagine “rewinding” 
the episode in each case to a point before the aggressor slaps 
Hemo: 
 
The same good fortune is possible at earlier 
“internal” stages.  For example, at the stage when 
Hotspur would begin to burn with rage, a speck of 
dust throws Witwood into a sneezing fit, 
preventing any rage from arising.  He can no more 
be responsible for a feeling he did not have than 
for a death that did not happen.  Similarly, at the 
point when Hotspur would be right on the verge of 
forming his intention, Witwood is distracted at 
just that instant by a loud noise.  By the time the 
noise subsides, Witwood’s blood has cooled, and he 
forms no intention to slap Hemo . . . . [I]n whatever 
sense legal responsibility for external states can 
be contingent on factors beyond one’s control and 
therefore a matter of luck, in precisely the same 
sense can “moral” responsibility for inner states 
also be contingent and a matter of luck.76 
 
To put this idea another way, causal luck can affect what 
happens inside the head, just as resultant luck can affect what 
happens outside the head.  The problem of moral luck therefore 
points toward a sort of actor’s control that seems necessary to 
ground the actor’s moral responsibility.  That type of control 
needs to overcome how causal luck affects what goes on in the 
actor’s head when she voluntary acts. 
 
 
76. Id. at 35. 
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B. The Problem of Free Will 
 
Causal luck also plays a role in a similar problem concerning 
the relationship between free will and determinism, sometimes 
called the problem of free will.  The rough idea behind the 
problem of free will is: If everything we do is causally 
determined, then it is not really up to us what we do—we are not 
really free because we are not really in control of what we do.  
On the other hand, if what we do is not causally determined by 
anything, then, again, we are not really free because we are not 
really in control of what we do.  If nothing determines what we 
do, then neither do we.  So although, intuitively, it seems as if it 
is really up to us what we do, at least sometimes, the foregoing 
seems to rule this out as a possibility—hence, the problem. 
It is important to formulate the problem of free will precisely 
to decide whether it admits of a possible resolution and to 
understand what differences there may be among competing 
solutions.  A set of standard terms has been developed to help 
accomplish this.  I shall adopt the definitions offered by one 
expert, Peter van Inwagen:77 
 
“Determinism is the thesis that the past and the 
laws of nature together determine, at every 
moment, a unique future . . . .”78 
 
Indeterminism is “[t]he denial of determinism  
. . . .”79 
 
The Free-Will Thesis is the thesis that “we are 
sometimes in the following position with respect 
to a contemplated future act: we simultaneously 
have both the following abilities: the ability to 
perform that act and the ability to refrain from 
performing that act (This entails that we have 
been in the following position: for something we 
did do, we were at some point prior to our doing it 
 
77. See generally van Inwagen, How to Think, supra note 9. 
78. Id. at 330 (emphasis added). 
79. Id. (emphasis added). 
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able to refrain from doing it, able not to do it).”80 
 
“Compatibilism is the thesis that determinism 
and the free-will thesis could both be true. . . .”81 
 
“[I]ncompatibilism is the denial of 
compatibilism.”82 
 
“Libertarianism is the conjunction of the free-will 
thesis and incompatibilism (Libertarianism thus 
entails indeterminism).”83 
 
“Soft determinism is the conjunction of 
determinism and the free-will thesis (Soft 
determinism thus entails compatibilism).”84 
 
With these definitions at hand, we can formulate the 
problem of free will as follows: “Free will seems to be 
incompatible both with determinism and indeterminism.  Free 
will seems, therefore, to be impossible.  But free will also seems 
to exist.  The impossible therefore seems to exist.  A solution  
. . . would be a way to resolve this apparent contradiction.”85 
One possible solution would be to deny the existence of free 
will, to deny the free-will thesis.  But if we deny the free-will 
thesis, then we run into trouble holding two other theses, both 
of which seem to be correct.86  The first is that ought implies can.  
If A lacks the ability to do, or refrain from doing, something, then 
A could not be morally required to do, or refrain from doing, it.  
 
80. Id. at 329 (emphasis added).  Famously, Harry Frankfurt raised a 
potential problem concerning this way of formulating the free-will thesis if we 
understand the free-will thesis as necessary for moral responsibility.  See infra 
Part II.C where I shall consider and adopt Frankfurt’s point. 
81. van Inwagen, How to Think, supra note 9, at 330 (emphasis added). 
82. Id. (emphasis added). 
83. Id. (emphasis added). 
84. Id. (emphasis added). 
85. Peter van Inwagen, Free Will Remains a Mystery: The Eighth 
Philosophical Perspectives Lecture, 14 PHIL. PERSP. 1, 11 (2000) [hereinafter 
van Inwagen, Free Will Remains]. 
86. Although some might dispute these two theses, this paper assumes 
that both are true. 
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For example, I could not morally be required to fly like Captain 
Marvel. 
If Laurel and Hardy are two random strangers who happen 
to meet, then it seems obvious, in the absence of any 
extraordinary countervailing factors, that Laurel should not kill 
Hardy.  If the free will thesis is false, however, then whenever 
Laurel is faced with a choice at a certain time and makes a 
particular decision, the decision that Laurel makes turns out to 
be the only one that Laurel had the ability to make at that time.  
But then, if Laurel kills Hardy, then Laurel never had the ability 
to refrain from killing Hardy.  So if we deny the free will thesis 
while trying to hold onto the thesis that ought implies can, then 
we must give up the idea that if Laurel kills Hardy, then Laurel 
does something that Laurel ought not to have done.  Further, if 
Laurel was not morally required to refrain from killing Hardy, 
then it becomes difficult to see how to justify: (a) having a system 
of legal punishment under which killers are punished, at least 
in part, because they are morally responsible for killing and (b) 
punishing Laurel under that system.  For when Laurel killed 
Hardy, Laurel did not do anything morally impermissible. 
The second, related thesis that is threatened by denying the 
free-will thesis is that A is sometimes morally responsible for 
what A does.87  If every action88 that A performs is the only one 
that A in fact ever has the ability to perform, then it seems 
implausible to ascribe moral responsibility to A for anything that 
A does.  The threat that A is never morally responsible for what 
A does persists, even when we ignore the external aspects of 
what A does and focus only on what might be termed A’s volition, 
 
87. The notion of moral responsibility here is: 
 
[A]n absolute responsibility wholly within the power of the 
agent . . . . To be morally responsible . . . is not [in itself] to be 
liable to any kind of official action or even to unofficial 
informal responses such as acts of blaming.  Moral 
responsibility . . . is liability to charges and credits on some 
ideal record, liability to credit or blame . . . . This record in 
turn can be used for any one of a variety of purposes—as a 
basis for self-punishment, remorse, or pride, for example. 
 
Feinberg, Justice and Personal Desert, supra note 50, at 30–31. 
88. Here, I am glossing over the difference between acting and omitting. 
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the executory89 mental state that occurs in A’s brain just before 
A acts.  If every facet of A’s internal psychological life is uniquely 
determined by past events, in principle, that occur before A is 
even born, in combination with the laws of nature, then causal 
luck affects even the formation of A’s volitions.90  Thus, the issue 
illustrated earlier by the example involving Hotspur, Witwood, 
and Hemo arises again, this time in connection with the problem 
of free will.  If Hotspur forms the volition to strike Hemo, then 
that volition is the only volition that was ever within Hotspur’s 
ability to form.  So whether Hotspur forms the volition to strike 
Hemo is a matter of Hotspur’s luck.  When even Hotspur’s 
volitions are in this sense not under Hotspur’s control, it begins 
to seem impossible for Hotspur ever to be morally responsible for 
what he does.  So solving the problem of free will by denying the 
free-will thesis seems off the table for anyone who thinks that 
we are ever morally responsible for what we do.91 
Assuming that the free-will thesis is true and that we are at 
least sometimes morally responsible for what we do, there seems 
to be two ways to show how free will is possible—either 
convincingly argue that determinism is compatible with the free-
will thesis or convincingly argue that indeterminism is.  At first 
blush, it may seem that the best option is to argue that 
indeterminism is compatible with free will.  Causal 
determination by factors entirely outside of one’s control seems 
 
89. See infra Part IV where I clarify the idea that a volition is a type of 
executory mental state, a type of intention. 
90. Nagel, supra note 67, at 35. 
 
If one cannot be responsible for consequences of one’s acts due 
to factors beyond one’s control, or for antecedents of one’s acts 
that are properties of temperament not subject to one’s will, 
or for the circumstances that pose one’s moral choices, then 
how can one be responsible even for the stripped-down acts 
of the will itself, if they are the product of antecedent 
circumstances outside of the will’s control? 
 
Id. 
91. Since retributivists think that justly punished criminals must have 
been morally responsible for committing their crimes, I shall assume that 
retributivists accept the free-will thesis.  It is not as clear that utilitarians 
must accept the free-will thesis, since utilitarian justifications of punishment 
do not primarily turn on whether the criminal defendant is morally responsible 
for what she does. 
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to pose the more serious threat to moral responsibility.  If factors 
over which I lack any control determine everything that I do, or 
even think, feel, or will, then how can anything that I do ever 
really be up to me in the manner that the free-will thesis 
suggests? 
But at least certain forms of indeterminism also seem 
incompatible with the free-will thesis.  These include non-causal 
and event-causal varieties.  According to non-causal 
indeterminism, “actions are free if the simple [mental] actions at 
their core are uncaused.”92  But if the cores of such actions are 
uncaused, then the agent does not cause them and, therefore, 
does not control them.  The problem seems just as vexing when 
nothing has control as when something other than the agent 
does.93 
According to event-causal indeterminism, certain agent-
involving events cause those of an agent’s actions for which the 
agent is morally responsible.  When those agent-involving 
events non-deterministically cause a free action: 
 
[T]he agent exercises . . . a certain variety of active 
control (which is said to consist in the action’s 
being caused . . . by those agent-involving events), 
the action is performed for a reason, and there 
remains, until she acts, a chance of the agent’s not 
performing that action.94 
 
92. Timothy O’Connor, Why Agent Causation?, 24 PHIL. TOPICS 143, 146 
(1996) [hereinafter O’Connor, Why Agent Causation?]. 
93. ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 292 (Harvard Univ. 
Press 1981) (“Random acts and caused acts alike seem to leave us not as the . 
. . originators of action but as an arena, a place where things happen, whether 
through earlier causes or spontaneously.”).  Along similar lines: 
 
An action’s being non-determined . . . is not sufficient for it to 
be free . . . . If we acted in the way uranium 238 emits alpha 
particles, determinism would be false but (unless we are 
greatly mistaken about uranium 238) we would not thereby 
have free will. 
 
Id. at 299. 
94. Randolph Clarke & Justin Capes, Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) 
Theories of Free Will, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (rev. ed. 
2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories/. 
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But such agent-involving events do not seem to provide the 
agent the requisite control any more than uncaused events do.  
“[T]he relevant causal conditions antecedent to a decision  
. . . would leave it open whether this decision will occur . . . . 
[A]nd whether [the decision occurs] is not settled by the agent.  
Hence, the agent lacks the control required for being morally 
responsible for the decision.”95 
So where does this leave us?  It would seem that the 
retributivist must choose between libertarianism and soft 
determinism.96  These two positions yield competing solutions to 
the problem of free will that might preserve moral responsibility, 
since according to both, the free-will thesis is true.  Consider the 
following two propositions: 
 
(1)   When the moment of choice arrives, A has the 
ability to do X and the ability not to do X. 
 
(2)   Given the past, before A’s birth, and the laws 
of nature, it is uniquely determined, even 
before A is born, that A does X when the 
moment of choice arrives. 
 
If we understand the term ability in (1) to refer to the sort 
of control that an agent must have over her conduct to be morally 
responsible for it, then the libertarian thinks that (1) and (2) 
could not both be true.  The libertarian’s intuition is that because 
neither the past state of the world, before A’s birth, nor the laws 
of nature are at all up to A, anything that the past and the laws 
of nature necessitate is not up to A either.  A could not have the 
ability not to do something, here, X, that is necessitated that 
way. 
The soft determinist, in contrast, sees no problem with (1) 
and (2) both being true.  The soft determinist adopts the view 
that A has the ability to do or not to do X, provided that A would 
 
95. Derk Pereboom, Is Our Conception of Agent-Causation Coherent?, 32 
PHIL. TOPICS 275, 276 (2004). 
96. By way of reminder: Libertarianism is the conjunction of the free-will 
thesis and incompatibilism. Soft determinism is the conjunction of the free-will 
thesis and determinism. 
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have done or not have done X had A chosen to or not to.97  Once 
we understand A’s ability to do X to amount to A would have 
done X if A had chosen to, the tension with determinism is 
eliminated.  As the soft determinist might say: So what if A was 
necessitated by factors completely beyond A’s control not to choose 
to do X at the moment of choice?  A had the ability to do X because 
A would have done X if A had chosen to. 
To justify the VAR in relation to a defendant’s desert, the 
retributivist must deal with the problem of moral luck and the 
problem of free will in a way that preserves moral responsibility.  
To do that, the retributivist must adopt either libertarianism or 
soft determinism.  This paper argues that the most plausible 
option for the retributivist is to adopt libertarianism in 
combination with a view called agent causalism, according to 
which we are the causes of our conduct when we voluntarily act 
and are morally responsible for what we do, as opposed to events 
that cause our conduct.  For retributivist justifications of the 
VAR to be plausible, agent causalism must be true. 
Before proceeding to that argument, it is important to 
reconsider an important aspect of how the problem of free will is 
formulated.  The standard type of formulation outlined above 
presupposes what has been termed the Principle of Alternate 
Possibilities (“PAP”).  The PAP, however, has been seriously 
called into question.  So before continuing with the main line of 
argument, I shall explain, following a well-known observation by 
Harry Frankfurt,98 why the PAP is false and consider whether 
this has any impact on the retributivist’s choice between 
libertarianism and soft determinism. 
 
C. The Principle of Alternate Possibilities 
 
Recall the free-will thesis: 
 
 
97. To put it a slightly different way, assume that A chose not to do X and 
was determined so to choose.  The soft determinist holds that A had the ability 
to do X as long as: A would have done X if A had formed the volition to do X.  
Presumably, it would have been A’s volition to do X that caused A’s doing X 
had A formed that volition. 
98. See generally Harry G. Frankfurt, Alternate Possibilities and Moral 
Responsibility, 66 J. PHIL. 829 (1969). 
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[W]e are sometimes in the following position with 
respect to a contemplated future act: we 
simultaneously have both the following abilities: 
the ability to perform that act and the ability to 
refrain from performing that act (This entails that 
we have been in the following position: for 
something we did do, we were at some point prior 
to our doing it able to refrain from doing it, able 
not to do it.).99 
 
If we understand free will to be important at least in part 
because it secures the possibility of moral responsibility, then 
formulating the free-will thesis this way seems implicitly to 
presuppose the PAP: “[A] person is morally responsible for what 
he has done only if he could have done otherwise.”100  Despite the 
PAP’s initial plausibility, Harry Frankfurt provided a 
persuasive reason to think it false: 
 
[T]here may be circumstances that make it 
impossible for a person to avoid performing some 
action without those circumstances in any way 
bringing it about that he performs that action. It 
would surely be no good for the person to refer to 
circumstances of this sort in an effort to absolve 
himself of moral responsibility for performing the 
action in question. For those circumstances, by 
hypothesis, actually had nothing to do with his 
having done what he did.101 
 
To illustrate his main idea, Frankfurt creates an example in 
which someone called Black is prepared to take steps to assure 
that another person, Jones, does what Black wants Jones to do.  
(Frankfurt emphasizes that the idea that it is a person—Black—
that is doing this is irrelevant; a non-personal causal agency 
would do just as well.)  What Black’s steps are is left to the 
imagination of the reader, as long as the reader would 
 
99. van Inwagen, How to Think, supra note 9, at 329. 
100. Frankurt, supra note 98, at 829. 
101. Id. at 837. 
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acknowledge that those steps assure that Jones can do only what 
Black wants Jones to do.102 
Frankfurt’s example: 
 
Suppose someone—Black, let us say—wants 
Jones[] to perform a certain action. Black is 
prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his 
way, but he prefers to avoid showing his hand 
unnecessarily. So he waits until Jones[] is about 
to make up his mind what to do, and he does 
nothing unless it is clear to him (Black is an 
excellent judge of such things) that Jones[] is 
going to decide to do something other than what 
he wants him to do. If it does become clear that 
Jones[] is going to decide to do something else, 
Black takes effective steps to ensure that Jones[] 
decides to do, and that he does do, what [Black] 
wants him to do. Whatever Jones[]’s initial 
preferences and inclinations, then, Black will 
have his way . . . . Now suppose that Black never 
has to show his hand because Jones[], for reasons 
of his own, decides to perform and does perform 
the very action Black wants him to perform. In 
that case, it seems clear, Jones[] will bear 
precisely the same moral responsibility for what 
he does as he would have borne if Black had not 
been ready to take steps to ensure that he do it. It 
would be quite unreasonable to excuse Jones[] for 
his action, or to withhold the praise to which it 
would normally entitle him, on the basis of the 
 
102. See generally id. at 835. 
 
What steps will Black take, if he believes he must take steps, 
in order to ensure that Jones[] decides and acts as [Black] 
wishes?  Anyone with a theory concerning what “could have 
done otherwise” means may answer this question for himself 
by describing whatever measures he would regard as 
sufficient to guarantee that, in the relevant sense, Jones[] 
cannot do otherwise. 
 
Id. 
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fact that he could not have done otherwise.103 
 
Because he concludes that the PAP is false, Frankfurt 
proposes a similar, modified version that he thinks may be true. 
Call it the “PAP′”: “[A] person is not morally responsible for what 
he has done if he did it only because he could not have done 
otherwise.”104  The force of the term because in the PAP′ is not 
justificatory, but explanatory.  That is, if the correct causal 
explanation of how someone behaves on a certain occasion 
includes her inability to behave in any other way on that 
occasion, then she is not morally responsible for her behavior on 
that occasion. 
As previously explained, the retributivist who wants to 
justify the VAR faces a choice between libertarianism and soft 
determinism.  Facially, the PAP′ is consistent with either 
position.  If causal determinism is true, then, according to the 
libertarian, no one is ever morally responsible for what she does 
because her conduct is always caused by factors, such as the 
history of the world and the deterministic laws of nature, that 
guarantee that she could not have done otherwise.  It is largely 
for that very reason that the libertarian endorses 
indeterminism.  The soft determinist would agree that those 
same factors, the history of the world and the laws of nature, 
always ultimately necessitate someone’s behavior.  But the soft 
determinist would insist that those factors are consistent with 
her ability, at the time of choice, to do otherwise.  She could have 
done otherwise because she would have done otherwise if she 
had chosen to.  In other words, the soft determinist can accept 
the PAP′ and determinism simultaneously, without concern that 
our status as morally responsible agents is in peril. 
In light of the problem of free will, is there any reason for a 
retributivist who aspires to justify the VAR not to be a soft 
determinist?  I submit that there is and that it is compelling.  
Soft determinism’s view about when it is within someone’s 
ability105 to do something is extremely implausible.  If every 
detail of A’s psychology over the course of A’s entire life is 
 
103. Id. at 835–36. 
104. Id. at 838. 
105. Here, a person’s ability to do something must encompass the sort of 
control necessary to ground moral responsibility for doing that thing. 
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necessitated by factors entirely outside of A’s control, then it is 
extremely implausible that A has the ability to do X simply 
because A would have done X had A chosen to.  Human persons 
like A have beliefs and desires that, at least sometimes, can 
rationally influence and explain how they behave.  A tornado, in 
contrast, is not that sort of thing.  And A’s being the sort of thing 
that can make choices on the basis of reasons, by entering into 
various intentional106 states that play a role in causing those 
choices, seems to be a necessary condition for A to be the sort of 
thing that properly can be subject to moral assessment.  But 
being capable of choosing for reasons by entering into intentional 
states is not sufficient for moral responsibility.  If the existence, 
content, and causal effects of A’s mental states are entirely 
outside of A’s control—if they are not at all up to A—then it is 
hard to see how those mental states, or counterfactual claims 
about choices resulting from them, could explain how A could be 
more of a morally responsible agent than a tornado could ever 
be.  And it would be absurd to claim that a tornado might deserve 
legal punishment for its conduct. 
One of the statements in the formulation of the problem of 
moral luck considered in Part III.A was: 
 
(CP)  We are morally assessable only to the extent 
that what we are assessed for depends on factors 
under our control. 
 
The soft determinist’s conception of control cannot justify 
the sort of moral assessment to which (CP) refers.107 
 
106. Here, the noun form of intentional is the technical term 
intentionality.  Intentionality refers to “that property of many mental states 
and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of 
affairs in the world.”  JOHN R. SEARLE, The Nature of Intentional States, in 
INTENTIONALITY: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 1 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1983).  Intentionality here means aboutness, not purposiveness.  
“[I]ntending to do something is just one form of [i]ntentionality along with 
belief, hope, fear, desire, and lots of others.”  Id. at 3. 
107. Beyond what I have written in the preceding paragraph, I have 
nothing worthwhile to offer the soft determinist that might convince her that 
her view is incorrect.  And I recognize that there are many capable, convinced 
soft determinists.  Soft determinists need to explain how their conception of an 
agent’s control makes defensible the moral assessment of the agent.  And there 
is an enormous literature that tries to do that.  Addressing those arguments 
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IV. Agent Causalism 
 
In light of the problem of free will, therefore, it seems that 
libertarianism is the way to go for retributivists seeking to 
justify the VAR.  As explained earlier, however, the idea that 
some events are uncaused or that some events non-
deterministically cause free choices does not help make room for 
moral responsibility or desert.  This is where agent causalism 
comes in. 
Whenever A voluntarily does something, we can ask 
whether A, the agent, is ever the cause of what A does.  
Alternatively, we can ask whether it is always some event or 
chain of, perhaps neurophysiological, events—distinct from A—
that causes what A does.  Those who hold that only events ever 
stand in direct causal relations are called event-causalists;108 
and those who think that sometimes agents stand in direct 
causal relations to events are called agent-causalists.  Event-
causalists believe that all causes are events and that, 
correspondingly, there is only one kind of basic causal relation—
a relation whose subject and object are both events.  “[T]he 
event-causalist [contends] that the causation of events intrinsic 
to . . . actions by the intendings [i.e., volitions] of an agent is just 
a matter of ‘ordinary’ event-causation.”109  An agent-causalist, 
on the other hand, believes that voluntary actions involve an 
irreducible causal relation whose subject is the agent herself.  
According to agent-causalism, some causes are substances,110 
 
exceeds what I can do in this paper. 
108. See John Bishop, Agent-causation, 92 MIND 61 (1983). 
 
Does every intentional action involve an irreducible causal 
relation whose subject is, not an event or sequence of events, 
but the agent himself?  Those who say not [can be called] 
event-causalists . . . . To them, the causal component in 
intentional action is a matter of ‘ordinary’ causal relations 
amongst events, and the explanation of behaviour as 
intentional action is just a species of ‘ordinary’ causal 
explanation. 
 
Id. at 61. 
109. Id. at 63. 
110. The term “substances” is a metaphysical term.  But although it is 
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called agents, and there is a corresponding distinctive and 
irreducible form of agent-causal relation in addition to the type 
of causal relation that can hold between events.  This 
irreducible111 agent-causal relation constitutes an agent’s 
control over her actions.  And this sort of control makes an agent 
morally responsible for her choices because it is a distinctive sort 
of power: “[A] causal power, fundamentally as a substance, to 
cause a decision without being causally determined to do so.”112 
Timothy O’Connor offers further elaboration: 
 
Wherever the agent-causal relation obtains, the 
agent bears a property or set of properties that is 
‘choice-enabling’ (i.e., in virtue of such properties, 
the agent has a type of causal power which . . . we 
may term “active power”).  But this ‘active 
power’—the causal power in virtue of which one 
has freedom of will—is not characterized by any 
function from circumstances to effects (as is the 
case with event causal powers).  For the properties 
that confer such a capacity do not themselves . . . 
necessitate or make probable a certain effect.  
Rather, they . . . make possible the direct, 
purposive bringing about of an effect by the agent 
who bears them.  Such properties thus play a 
different functional role in the associated causal 
process . . . . [T]hese properties give rise to a 
fundamentally different type of causal power—
 
abstract, it should not be considered unclear, abstruse, or highfalutin.  “There 
is an ordinary concept in play when philosophers discuss ‘substance’, and this 
. . . is the concept of object, or thing when this is contrasted with properties or 
events.”  Howard Robinson, Substance, in  STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (rev. ed.  2014), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/. 
111. “Irreducible” refers to the impossibility of reducing an agent-causal 
relation in terms of event-causal relations alone.  In other words, agent-
causation is not ultimately a complicated form of event-causation in disguise.  
Agent-causation is a fundamental sort of causation, just as the fundamental 
forces of physics are not reducible to one unifying force.  (At least, so far as I 
know, the fundamental forces of physics have not been unified yet—maybe 
they will be, and maybe they will not.  If we discover that the fundamental 
forces are unified, we would realize that they were not really fundamental in 
the way we thought they were.) 
112. Pereboom, supra note 95, at 278. 
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one that in suitable circumstances is exercised at 
will by the agent, rather than of necessity, as with 
objects that are not partly self-determining 
agents.113 
 
This power must also be reasons-responsive—the agent can 
act rationally, for reasons, when she exercises this power.  
Reasons must be capable of guiding, explaining, and justifying 
what an agent does when she freely acts.  In other words, when 
an agent voluntarily acts, the agent-causal power operates in 
concert with her intentional states, beliefs, desires, etc., such 
that the contents of those states play an indispensable role in 
explaining what the agent does.  Acting with moral 
responsibility requires the capacity to act on the basis of 
practical reason.114 
Obviously missing from the explanation of agent causalism 
offered thus far is a detailed specification of the set of properties 
and circumstances such that, if a substance has those properties 
in those circumstances, then the substance is an agent that can 
directly bring about an event in response to reasons to do so.  But 
there is not anything incoherent or implausible about there 
being such a specification, if only we could identify it.  A pane of 
 
113. O’Connor, Why Agent Causation?, supra note 92, at 145. Along 
similar lines: 
 
[T]he agency theory . . . affirms the completely general claim 
. . . that objects have causal powers in virtue of their 
properties, so that objects sharing the same properties share 
the same causal capacities . . . . [S]ome properties contribute 
to the causal powers of the objects that bear them in a very 
different way from the event-causal paradigm, in which an 
object’s possession of property P in circumstance C 
necessitates or makes probable a certain effect.  On this 
alternative picture, a property of the right sort can (in 
conjunction with appropriate circumstances) make possible 
the direct, purposive bringing about of an effect by the agent 
who bears it. 
 
Timothy O’Connor, Agent Causation, in AGENTS, CAUSES, AND EVENTS: ESSAYS 
ON INDETERMINISM AND FREE WILL 173, 177 (Timothy O’Connor ed., Oxford 
Univ. Press 1995) [hereinafter O’Connor, Agent Causation]. 
114. See infra Part V where I shall elaborate how agent-causal power 
might fit within a picture of how an agent acts for reasons by considering the 
anatomy of a voluntary act. 
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glass is fragile, and in certain circumstances it will either 
certainly shatter or have a high probability of shattering.  
Presumably, there is a detailed technical specification of the 
micro-structural properties of the pane of glass that, if only we 
could identify it, would illuminate why the pane of glass behaves 
that way in those circumstances.115  What rules out a 
specification of a thing’s properties and a set of circumstances 
that illuminates why that thing, and any other thing that has 
those properties in those types of circumstances, is capable of 
being an agent that can directly cause an event in response to 
reasons?  Of course, we eventually might learn enough, 
empirically, about how our brains work that we become 
convinced that there is no accurate specification of our 
properties in any set of circumstances that could explain how we 
could be agents.116  If that were to happen, then retributivist 
approaches to justifying the VAR would be in serious trouble. 
How does agent-causation empower people to be morally 
responsible for what they do?  When an actor freely acts, she 
agent-causes117 her decision to do so.  Actors are morally 
responsible for what they do when they agent-cause their 
decisions to act.  A Frankfurt-style scenario suggested by 
William Rowe can help clarify this idea.  Imagine that Jones is 
deciding whether (a) to keep some money that does not belong to 
him or (b) to return the money to its rightful owner, who needs 
 
115. I suspect that we already have such a specification available, based 
on our empirically-acquired knowledge of glass. 
116. For example, one empirical study seems to indicate that certain 
voluntary decisions are caused by brain activity that occurs before the subject 
is conscious of making a decision.  This suggests that it is not the subject 
herself who causes the voluntary conduct—preconscious brain events and 
brain states cause it instead.  See Benjamin Libet et al., Time of Conscious 
Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential): 
The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act, 106 BRAIN 623 (1983).  
Although I do not believe that this study, standing alone, is a serious threat to 
agent causalism, if enough sophisticated studies of complex human decision 
making were performed that generated results inconsistent with the agent-
causalist picture, then agent causalism would be falsified, as least as to us.  It 
would turn out that even if there were agents, we would not be included among 
them. 
117. To say that an actor agent-causes an event is to mean that the above-
mentioned irreducible causal relation (whose subject is the actor herself) is 
realized and that the event occurs in virtue of that causal relation being 
realized. 
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that money more than Jones does.  Jones thinks that the morally 
right thing to do is to return the money.  But he selfishly decides 
to keep it for himself under the following conditions: 
 
No outside influence or internal desire or want 
caused him to decide to keep the money. He was 
free to cause and free not to cause his decision to 
keep the money. As it happened, he followed his 
selfish desire, rather than the advice of his 
conscience, and [agent-caused] his decision to 
keep the money, having it within his power, 
nevertheless, not to have [agent-caused] that 
decision. However, had he been about to [agent-
cause] the decision to return the money, the devil, 
let us suppose, would have directly caused in him 
the decision to keep the money, effectively 
preventing any decision or action on his part to 
return the money . . . . In a way, given the steady 
resolve of the devil, it is up to our agent whether 
he himself or the devil will be responsible for his 
decision to keep the money. By exercising his 
power to [agent-cause] his decision to keep the 
money, he makes himself responsible for that 
decision. Had he not [agent-caused] that decision, 
the devil, and not he, would have been responsible 
for his decision to keep the money. And had he not 
[agent-caused] his decision to keep the money, 
then, at long last, we would have a case in which 
someone might truthfully say: “the devil made me 
do it.”118 
 
In this example, when the devil does not make Jones keep 
the money, Jones agent-causes his decision to keep it.  And when 
the devil makes Jones do it, Jones does not agent-cause his 
decision—the devil causes it by causing in Jones a necessitating 
volition to keep the money, which in turn causes Jones to keep 
it.  Only when the devil does not make him do it is Jones morally 
responsible for keeping the money.  And it is up to Jones whether 
he is morally responsible, since Jones is in control of whether or 
 
118. William L. Rowe, Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and the Problem of 
“Oomph,” 10 J. ETHICS 295, 299 (2006). 
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not he agent-causes the decision.  If it were a crime for Jones to 
keep the money, then, in principle, Jones might deserve legal 
punishment for keeping the money if the devil did not make him 
do it.  And all of this is true even though Jones could not have 
done otherwise than to keep the money. 
As stated previously, this paper’s main thesis is that for 
retributivist justifications of the VAR to be plausible, agent 
causalism must be true.  This thesis is significant because agent 
causalism is contentious and may be false.  And if agent 
causalism is false, then retributivism could not play any role in 
substantiating the VAR, the fundamental legal precondition of 
ever imposing criminal liability upon anyone.  To be contentious, 
agent causalism must, to some degree, be plausible.  If agent 
causalism were entirely implausible, no one would take it 
seriously as a possibility.  And to be at all plausible, agent 
causalism must at least be coherent.  Although my objective is 
not thoroughly to defend agent causalism, I must explain how 
agent causalism is coherent and has at least some plausibility.  
Otherwise, this paper’s main thesis would not be significant in 
the way that I claim.119 
Why might someone think that agent causalism is 
incoherent or extremely implausible?  Before considering what I 
take to be two of the more challenging objections to agent 
causalism, let me quickly address what I consider to be, at most, 
a couple of superficial reasons to dismiss agent causalism.  A 
critic might believe that agent causalism is committed to non-
physical substances, souls, say, or to supernatural phenomena 
and that such commitments are farfetched.  Whether or not such 
things are farfetched, agent causalism is not committed to them.  
An agent causalist does think that agents are substances (things 
other than properties or events) and that this is important.  An 
agent causalist also thinks: (a) that these substances are able to 
cause events without being determined to do so; (b) that these 
 
119. If agent causalism were incoherent or entirely implausible, then this 
paper’s main thesis would still be significant.  For if it were obvious that agent 
causalism was incoherent or for some other reason was not true, then it would 
follow from this paper’s thesis that there would be no plausible way for 
retributivist justifications of the VAR to work.  But I think that there may be 
a plausible way for retributivist justifications of the VAR to work.  At least, I 
am not prepared to rule out such a possibility.  So I must explain how agent 
causalism is coherent and is at least somewhat plausible. 
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substances can thereby be morally responsible for their conduct; 
and (c) that (a) and (b) are important.  But there is no reason to 
think that according to agent causalism agents are non-physical 
or that agent-causation is not a natural type of causal relation.120 
For example, an agent causalist might think that organisms 
that can agent-cause events came to exist through evolutionary 
processes driven largely by natural selection, just as organisms 
that can fly, such as birds, came to exist through evolutionary 
processes driven largely by natural selection.  There is no more 
reason to think that agents are non-physical or that the causal 
relations involved in an agent’s ability to agent-cause events are 
supernatural than there is to think that birds are non-physical 
or that the causal relations involved in a bird’s ability to fly are 
supernatural. 
There are, however, more engaging objections to agent 
causalism.  One such objection concludes that either agent 
causalism is false or, even if true, agent causalism can account 
for an agent’s control over her conduct no better than the view 
that free actions are triggered by uncaused events can.  Recall 
that uncaused events seem unable to make moral responsibility 
possible because an event under nothing’s control is not under 
an actor’s control.  So if the actor’s, allegedly, free actions are 
caused by uncaused events, then her, allegedly, free actions are 
not under her control, and she therefore could not be morally 
responsible for them. 
The objection can be posed as follows: Every episode of agent 
causation features an agent, S, bringing about an event, e.  So 
every episode of agent causation is itself a complex event with 
the structure: S’s causing e.  Call that complex structured event 
“E.”  What causes E?  There seem to be only two available 
answers—either some earlier event causes E or S does.  If an 
earlier event causes E, then we face anew the same problem that 
agent causalism was supposed to help us solve.  Either that 
previous event was uncaused, or caused—maybe remotely—by 
an uncaused event, or determinism is true.  But if S causes E, 
then an infinite regress ensues.  For S to be morally responsible 
for conduct on a certain occasion, S must agent-cause an infinite 
 
120. An agent causalist might think such things, but agent causalism 
does not imply them. 
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number of events on that occasion: e; E; (S’s causing E); (S’s 
causing (S’s causing E)); (S’s causing (S’s causing (S’s causing 
E))); and so on.  And it is absurd to think that every time S freely 
acts S literally performs an infinite number of acts.  So if S 
causes E, then agent causalism must be false. 
The agent causalist can respond, however.  One possibility 
is to accept the infinite regress but insist that it is not vicious.  
For example, imagine that you walk in a straight line from the 
center of a room to one of the room’s walls, touching the wall.121  
Call that action—your walking to the wall—“a”.  Before you 
complete a, you complete another action—walking halfway to 
the wall.  After you walk halfway but before you get all the way 
to the wall, you complete a third action—walking three-quarters 
of the way to the wall—and so on.  In performing a quotidian 
action such as a, you perform an infinite number of actions.  But 
this infinite regress is not vicious.  If it were, then perhaps Zeno 
of Elea would have succeeded in showing that, appearances 
notwithstanding, you never get from point A to point B.122  
(“Sure, every time I freely act I perform an infinite number of 
actions.  But so what?  Every time I move from one place to 
another I perform an infinite number of actions.  Where’s the 
problem?”) 
Another possible response to the infinite regress objection 
has been suggested by Timothy O’Connor.  Call events such as 
E123 causally complex events.  Run-of-the-mill events that are not 
themselves instantiations of causal relations, call them causally 
simple events, lack the internal structure of causally complex 
events.  There are at least two types of causally complex 
events—event-causal events and agent-causal events.  Event-
causal events have the following structure: (E1’s causing E2), 
where E1 and E2 are events (themselves either causally complex 
or causally simple).  Agent-causal events have the following 
structure: (S’s causing E), where S is an agent and E is an event 
(itself either causally complex or causally simple): 
 
121. Assume for the sake of this example that space-time is continuous. 
122. “That which is in locomotion must arrive at the half-way stage before 
it arrives at the goal.” ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS VI: 9, 239b10 (recounting one of 
Zeno’s paradoxes of motion). 
123. Recall that E was (S’s causing e).  As will very shortly be explained, 
E is an example of an agent-causal event. 
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[I]nstantiations of . . . (causally complex events) 
are not themselves directly on the receiving end of 
other causal relations—instead . . . (causally 
simple . . . events) are. Causings are the 
producings of events, rather than what are 
produced (in the first instance). Compare an 
ordinary case of an event-causal process 
(consisting of event F’s causing event G) being 
caused by some further event E. Surely this can 
consist only in E’s causing F, the front-end 
relatum of the complex event . . . . If this is right, 
then an agent-causal event could not be caused for 
the simple reason that the cause in this case is not 
an event.124 
 
To unpack and amplify O’Connor’s response: The objection’s 
infinite regress gets going because it is assumed that any 
causally complex event, understood as a whole, must be brought 
about by something else, either another event or an agent.  But 
this assumption is false. 
 
(1) – In the case of an event-causal event (F’s 
causing G), nothing causes (F’s causing G) as a 
whole—causal relations themselves never get 
caused like that.  Instead, an event E or an agent 
A causes event F, the first component of the 
complex whole (F’s causing G).  And if F is caused 
in either of those ways, everything is accounted 
for—in particular, there are no uncaused events 
leftover.  For example, if E causes F and F causes 
G, then we have as much of an explanation of (F’s 
causing G) as there is to have. 
 
(2) – In the case of an agent-causal event (S’s 
causing e), nothing causes (S’s causing e) as a 
whole—causal relations themselves never get 
caused like that.  Instead, the only possibilities 
 
124. O’Connor, Why Agent Causation?, supra note 92, at 147. 
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are that an event E or an agent A causes agent S, 
the first component of the complex whole (S’s 
causing e).  But these prima facie possibilities are 
not real, because S the agent is a substance and 
therefore cannot be caused by anything.  S’s 
coming to exist (an event) can be caused; S’s 
changing (an event) can be caused; and S’s ceasing 
to exist (an event) can be caused; but S (the 
substance itself) cannot be caused.  Conceptually, 
agents are not the sorts of things that can be 
caused any more than touchdowns are the sorts of 
things that can be scored in chess matches.  So 
everything requiring a causal explanation is 
accounted for—in particular, there are no 
uncaused events leftover.  Agent causalism 
provides as much of an explanation of (S’s causing 
e) as there is to have. 
 
The critic might insist at this point that although event-
causal events are never caused as a whole, agent-causal events 
are, indeed, must be, so caused.  And because agent-causal 
events, as wholes, require causal explanations, the infinite 
regress is generated after all.125  But this appears to be an ad 
hoc claim about causation.  What motivates such a claim?  Why 
think that causation is radically discontinuous in that way?  For 
example, if the critic rejects agent causalism because of agent 
causalism’s, allegedly, indefensible commitment to two 
fundamentally different sorts of causation, then why would the 
critic be satisfied emphasizing that there is a fundamental 
difference between sorts of causally complex events—between 
event-causal events and agent-causal events?  What non-
question-begging argument is available to the critic to defend 
such a fundamental difference?  No such argument seems to be 
in the offing. 
 
125. Id. (“[T]he claim is that events can directly bring about causal 
relations when they relate an agent to an event, but not when they relate an 
event to a further event.”).  Perhaps another implication of the critic’s main 
claim here is that agents can directly bring about causal relations when they 
relate themselves to an event but not when they relate an event to a further 
event. The response to the critic would proceed the same way, mutatis 
mutandis. 
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The second of the more engaging objections to agent 
causalism that I shall consider tries to discredit agent 
causalism’s ability to account for how agents can act for reasons 
and how reasons can play an indispensable role in explaining 
what agents do.  In such reason-explanation accounts, “[a]n 
agent acts for a certain reason . . . only if the agent’s recognizing 
that reason causes, in an appropriate way, the agent’s behavior; 
and citing a reason contributes to a (true) reason-explanation of 
an action only if the agent’s recognizing that reason caused, in 
an appropriate way, the action.”126  But the agent causalist 
cannot think that an agent’s recognizing a reason alone is what 
causes the agent’s free behavior, for the agent’s recognizing a 
reason is an event, not a substance.127  Instead, the agent 
causalist insists that the agent herself does at least some of the 
causing.  So the agent causalist cannot provide a reason-
explanation account in the usual way.  Agent causalism is 
therefore faced with a challenge: Since the power of an agent to 
agent-cause events is reasons-responsive, agent causalism must 
be able to account for how reason-explanations of an agent’s 
behavior are possible.  But the standard way to do this is 
foreclosed to the agent causalist.  So how can agent causalism 
supply the requisite account? 
To respond to this challenge, the agent causalist must 
provide a plausible, non-standard account of reason-
explanations.  In Part V, drawing heavily on the work of others, 
I shall sketch such an account.  My goal will not be to establish 
dispositively that the account is true but to establish that the 
account is plausible—that it might well be true.  If the account 
to come is at least plausible, then agent causalism survives the 
second objection in that agent causalism remains plausible.  I 
turn now to the task of providing that account by examining the 
anatomy of a voluntary act and situating a voluntary act within 
the context of the commission of a crime. 
 
 
126. Randolph Clarke & Justin Capes, Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) 
Theories of Free Will, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (rev ed. 
2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories/. 
127. Id. (“Standard agent-causal views deny that events such as the 
agent’s recognizing certain reasons cause any free action (or whatever event 
the agent directly causes when she acts freely).”). 
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V. The Anatomy of a Voluntary Act and a Voluntary Act as a 
Part of a Crime 
 
To return to the VAR: “[a] person is not guilty of an offense 
unless his liability is based on conduct which includes a 
voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is 
physically capable.”128  In general, “if . . . the court can find a 
voluntary act by the defendant, accompanied at that time by 
whatever culpable mens rea that is required, which act in fact 
proximately causes some legally prohibited state of affairs, then 
the defendant is prima facie liable for that legal harm.”129 
The VAR is an aspect of the broader actus reus requirement, 
according to which there can be no criminal liability in the 
absence of an actus reus—“[t]he wrongful deed that comprises 
the physical components of a crime and that generally must be 
coupled with mens rea to establish criminal liability.”130  To 
connect the two legal requirements, “[t]he ‘voluntary act’ 
required for criminal liability is . . . to be understood as a bodily 
movement, and an actus reus can be analyzed into a (set of) 
bodily movements, and certain specified circumstances and 
consequences.”131  Thus, for the actus reus requirement to be 
satisfied, there must be, at the core of the actus reus, one or more 
voluntary body movements, which bring about prohibited states 
of affairs under specified circumstances.  Oliver Wendell Holmes 
described this core as “a voluntary muscular contraction, and 
nothing else.  The chain of physical sequences which it sets in 
 
128. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (1962).  Along similar lines in the 
context of a drunk driving charge: 
 
Though movement of a vehicle is an essential element of the 
statutory requirement, the mere movement of a vehicle does 
not necessarily, in every circumstance, constitute a ‘driving’ 
of the vehicle . . . . If a vehicle is moved by some power beyond 
the control of the driver, or by accident, it is not such an 
affirmative or positive action on the part of the driver as will 
constitute a driving of a vehicle within the meaning of the 
statute. 
 
State v. Taft, 102 S.E.2d 152, 154 (W. Va. 1958). 
129. See MOORE, ACT AND CRIME, supra note 16, at 35–36. 
130. Actus Reus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 37 (7th ed. 1999). 
131. Duff, Acting, Trying, and Criminal Liability, supra note 8, at 81–82. 
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motion or directs to the [resulting] harm is no part of it, and very 
generally a long train of such sequences intervenes.”132  The 
chain of consequences leads to or constitutes the state of affairs 
that is prohibited. 
For example, “[a] person is guilty of criminal homicide if he 
purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death 
of another human being.”133  Imagine that A purposely kills B by 
shooting B.  B’s being shot to death is the prohibited state of 
affairs; A’s moving her trigger finger is the voluntary act that 
causes the prohibited state of affairs; and the mens rea 
requirement134 is satisfied because A purposely kills B—it was 
A’s conscious objective to cause B’s death.  A has committed 
criminal homicide.  As this example illustrates, the voluntary 
act is A’s moving a part of her body, which kicks off a subsequent 
causal chain leading to the prohibited outcome.  John Austin 
elaborates: 
 
Most of the names which seem to be names of acts, 
are names of acts, coupled with certain of their 
consequences.  For example, [i]f I kill you with a 
gun or pistol, I shoot you: And the long train of 
incidents which are denoted by that brief 
expression, are considered . . . as if they 
constituted an act, perpetrated by me.  In truth, 
the only parts of the train which are my act or 
acts, are the muscular motions by which I raise 
the weapon; point it at your head or body, and pull 
the trigger.  These I will.  The contact of the flint 
and steel; the ignition of the powder, the flight of 
the ball towards your body, the wound and 
subsequent death, with the numberless incidents 
 
132. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 83-84 (Belknap 
Press 2009) (1881) (discussing acts in a torts context). 
133. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1(1) (1962). 
134. Note that the mens rea requirement corresponds to culpability, one 
of the factors that can influence a criminal defendant’s desert according to 
standard retributivist theories.  The MPC defines the four main types of mens 
rea—“purposely” (corresponding to purpose); “knowingly” (corresponding to 
knowledge); “recklessly” (corresponding to recklessness); and “negligently” 
(corresponding to criminal negligence).  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (titled 
“General Requirements of Culpability.”). 
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included in these, are consequences of the act 
which I will.  I will not those consequences, 
although I may intend them.135 
 
The only things that get willed in the passage above are 
muscular body movements.  Everything else is at most intended.  
And the “names of acts” to which Austin refers correspond to 
descriptions of what the agent does.  Joel Feinberg suggests a 
metaphor for these act-descriptions: 
 
This well-known feature of our language, whereby 
a man’s action can be described almost as 
narrowly or as broadly as we please, might 
fittingly be called the “accordion effect,” because 
an action, like the folding musical instrument, can 
be squeezed down to a minimum or else stretched 
way out.  He turned the key, he opened the door, 
he startled Paul, he killed Paul—all of these 
things we might say that Peter did with one 
identical set of bodily movements.136 
 
Thus, two things are true of Austin’s pistol-shooting finger 
movement.  First, it is a muscular movement that initiates a 
causal chain; and second, it is the object, or part of the object, of 
a set of descriptions exhibiting the accordion effect.  In addition, 
there are two other facts about the finger movement: 
 
A.  The movement is, or is part of,137 a basic 
action. 
 
B.  The movement is voluntary. 
 
135. JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
POSITIVE LAW 427–28 (Robert Campbell ed., 4th ed., London: John Murrary, 
Albemarle Street 1873) (emphasis removed). 
136. Joel Feinberg, Action and Responsibility, in DOING AND DESERVING: 
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 119, 134 (Princeton Univ. Press 1970) 
[hereinafter Feinberg, Action and Responsibility]. 
137. See infra for an explanation that the bodily movement will be one 
component of a basic action.  It will not be identical to the basic action as a 
whole. 
53
  
698 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  36:3 
 
A. The Movement is a Basic Action 
 
Actions can be divided into two kinds—basic and complex.  
A complex action is performed by performing some other action.  
For example, A prepares dinner by doing a number of other 
things—slicing vegetables, turning on the oven, and so forth.  So 
preparing dinner is a complex action.  In contrast, “B is a basic 
action of a if and only if (i) B is an action and (ii) whenever a 
performs B, there is no other action A performed by a such that 
B is caused by A.”138  For example, me wiggling my toe is a basic 
action because when I wiggle my toe there is nothing else that I 
do that causes my toe to wiggle. 
Douglas Lavin elaborates the notion of a basic action: 
 
Basic action is a limit on [a] rational order of 
means and ends.  It can be described from either 
side of the relation.  Through the concept of an 
end: a basic action is not the end of any other 
action; nothing else is done in order to do it; it is 
not an answer to “Why?” when asked about any 
other action.  And equally through the concept of 
a means: no means are taken in the execution of a 
basic action; it is not done by doing anything else; 
there is no answer to “How?” when asked of it.  I 
illuminated the room by means of turning on the 
light, turned on the light by flipping the switch, 
and flipped the switch by moving my finger, but 
maybe moving my finger is something I simply 
did, something which did not involve taking any 
steps or means, or again doing anything with a 
view to moving my finger?  If so, it is a basic 
action: That X is doing/did A is basic just when 
there is no A* such that X is doing/did A* in order 
to do A; or again, That X is doing/did A is basic 
 
138. Arthur Danto & Sidney Morgenbesser, What We Can Do, 60 J. PHIL. 
435, 435 (1963).  I would suggest a third condition that must also be satisfied: 
(iii) whenever a performs B, there is no other action A performed by a such that 
a knows that B’s occurring is causally necessary for (and precedes) A and a 
performs A to assure B’s occurring. 
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just when there is no A* such that X is doing/did 
A by means of doing A*.139 
 
If A raises her arm, then A performs a basic action because 
there is nothing else that A does that causes her arm to rise.  Of 
course, in the normal type of arm-raising case events happen 
before A’s arm rises that cause A’s arm to rise—bioelectrical 
impulses travel along A’s arm-nerves and so forth—but these 
events are not actions140 performed by A.  Also, it is possible for 
A’s raising her arm not to be a basic action.  Imagine that A’s 
arm is paralyzed but connected to a pulley system that, if 
activated, will raise it.  In such a case, A’s raising her arm by 
activating the pulley system would be a complex action, not a 
basic one. 
 
B. The Movement is Voluntary 
 
In addition to being a basic action, the pistol-shooting finger 
movement must be voluntary for the VAR to be satisfied.  
Beyond the idea, discussed earlier, that voluntariness 
guarantees a sort or degree of actor-control, what makes a body 
 
139. Douglas Lavin, Must There Be Basic Action?, 47 NOÛS 273, 275 
(2013) (emphasis added). Further: 
 
That there are such things as simple [i.e., basic] acts should 
be beyond controversy, partly because each person has direct 
experience of them in his own case and partly because a 
denial of their existence leads to an infinite regress and 
attendant conceptual chaos. If, before we could do anything, 
we had to do something else first as a means, then clearly we 
could never get started. As one writer puts it, ‘If there are any 
actions at all, there are basic actions.’ 
 
Feinberg, supra note 136, at 136 (quoting Arthur Danto, Basic Actions, 2 AM. 
PHIL. Q. 141, 142 (1965)). But cf. Douglas Lavin, Must There Be Basic Action?, 
47 NOÛS 273 (2013) (arguing that there might not be such things as basic 
actions). 
140. One could conceptualize A’s making her “arm-raising” arm-nerves 
fire as an action in certain situations.  For example, imagine that A knows that 
a particular cluster of her arm-nerves fires and causes her arm muscles to 
contract every time she raises her arm, and assume that A sets out to fire those 
nerves by raising her arm.  In such a case, A’s firing her arm-nerves would be 
a complex action because condition (iii) (for basic actions) would not be 
satisfied.  See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
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movement a voluntary act in the sense of the VAR?  The MPC 
provides the beginning of an answer, since it clarifies that body 
movements do not count as voluntary acts when they are “not a 
product of the effort or determination of the actor, either 
conscious or habitual.”141  The MPC also explicitly rules out 
certain categories of body movements from being voluntary 
actions, including reflex movements, unconscious movements, 
and movements resulting from hypnotic suggestion.142 
Reconsider the MPC’s positive characterization of voluntary 
actions, such as simple body movements, as those resulting from 
the “effort or determination” of the actor.143  The MPC comments 
explain that bodily movements that result from an actor’s effort 
or determination are to be understood as movements that result 
from an unimpeded exercise of the actor’s will: 
 
[The MPC] formulates a residual category of 
involuntary movements, describing them as those 
that “otherwise . . . [are] not a product of the effort 
or determination of the actor, either conscious or 
habitual.”  The formulation seeks to express the 
main content of the traditional idea of an 
“external manifestation of the actor’s will”  
. . . . In other respects the formulation . . . is 
designed to make the requirement of an act a 
minimal one.144 
 
To flesh out the idea that a bodily movement is an “external 
manifestation of the actor’s will,” I shall adopt the view that a 
 
141. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2)(d) (AM. LAW. INST., Official Draft and 
Revised Comments 1985). 
142. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2)(a)–(c) (AM. LAW. INST., Official 
Draft and Revised Comments 1985). 
143. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2)(d) (AM. LAW. INST., Official Draft 
and Revised Comments 1985). 
144. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and 
Revised Comments 1985).  Similarly, the VAR, “stated in its simplest form, is 
that the ‘act’ of the accused, in the sense of a muscular movement, must be 
willed.  It must be a voluntary expression of the accused’s will. . . .”  H.L.A. 
HART, Acts of Will and Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: 
ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 90, 94–95 (2d ed. 2008) (quoting J. Ll. J. 
Edwards, Automatism and Criminal Responsibility, 21 MOD. L. REV. 375, 380 
(1958)). 
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voluntary basic action is, at least in part, the causal result of the 
actor’s preceding mental states—intentional mental states, in 
particular.  (Here, “intentional” means having the property of 
intentionality (roughly, “aboutness”).)  The content of an 
intentional mental state is often understood to be a proposition.  
For example, Fred’s belief that his room is clean has 
intentionality, and its content is the proposition that Fred’s room 
is clean.  If Fred has a phobia of clean rooms, then he might fear 
that his room is clean.  If so, then his fear has intentionality, and 
its content is the same proposition—that Fred’s room is clean.  If 
Fred resolves to clean his room, forming the intention, or 
volition,145 to do so, then his intention has intentionality, and 
again, its content is the same proposition—that Fred’s room is 
clean.  Because they have propositions as their contents, mental 
states such as beliefs, fears, and volitions are often referred to 
as propositional attitudes. 
When someone acts voluntarily, what different sorts of 
intentional mental states or faculties are involved?  The 
following is a partial breakdown of voluntarily visiting a 
neighbor: 
 
[I]f someone desires to visit his neighbour and 
believes that knocking on the neighbour’s door 
will facilitate a visit, and hence forms the 
intention to knock on the neighbour’s door, he is 
thereby prepared to exercise his will—he then 
tries to knock on the door, and with luck succeeds 
in performing the intended action.146 
 
Featured in this breakdown are: (1) belief, (2) desire, (3) 
intention, and (4) will (the exercise of which is a “trying”).  
Turning first to (1)–(3): An intention is more like a desire than a 
belief in that desires and intentions are examples of what might 
be termed pro-attitudes, whereas a belief is not a pro-attitude.  
What does it take for a propositional attitude to be a pro-
attitude?  Not much.  Pro-attitudes include “desires, wantings, 
 
145. Although there is some dispute over the matter, I shall assume that 
a volition is an intention, not a type of belief or desire. 
146. COLIN MCGINN, THE CHARACTER OF MIND: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 131 (2d ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1982). 
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urges, promptings, and a great variety of moral views, aesthetic 
principles, economic prejudices, social conventions, and public 
and private goals and values in so far as these can be interpreted 
as attitudes of an agent directed toward actions of a certain 
kind.”147  Indeed, pro-attitudes might include: 
 
[N]ot only permanent character traits that show 
themselves in a lifetime of behavior, like love of 
children or a taste for loud company, but also the 
most passing fancy that prompts a unique action, 
like a sudden desire to touch a woman’s elbow.  In 
general, pro attitudes must not be taken for 
convictions, however temporary, that every action 
of a certain kind ought to be performed, is worth 
performing, or is, all things considered, desirable.  
On the contrary, a man may all his life have a yen, 
say, to drink a can of paint, without ever, even at 
the moment he yields, believing it would be worth 
doing.148 
 
In a nutshell, a pro-attitude is any propositional attitude 
that favors the coming true of the proposition,  that is,  the 
attitude’s content, and thereby can be connected causally to 
some action of the agent who has the attitude.  Beliefs are not 
pro-attitudes even in this very broad sense, as they 
characteristically represent a proposition neutrally, as already 
being true.149 
Pro-attitudes also have a characteristic direction of fit, 
which differs from the direction of fit of a belief.  “It is 
characteristic of [beliefs] to represent the world as being a 
certain way, and [a belief] can be judged correct or incorrect 
according to whether the world is the way it is represented to be; 
the role of [beliefs] is to fit the world.”150  A mis-fitting belief is 
 
147. Donald Davidson, Actions, Reasons and Causes, 60 J. PHIL. 685, 686 
(1963). 
148. Id. 
149. I am simplifying by glossing over issues that might be raised, for 
example, by versions of moral internalism according to which believing certain 
propositions is itself sufficient for some degree of motivation. 
150. MCGINN, supra note 146, at 117. 
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defective, and we call that defect being false.  On the other hand: 
 
[D]esires [and other pro-attitudes] are said to 
have a “direction of fit” . . . that is the opposite to 
the “direction of fit” of beliefs . . . . [B]eliefs are like 
declarative sentences, which are satisfied (made 
true) by whether the world as it is conforms to 
them.  But desires are like imperative sentences, 
which are satisfied (fulfilled) by changes in the 
world bringing the world into conformity with 
them.151 
 
Although both intentions and desires are pro-attitudes, they 
are pro-attitudes of different types: 
 
[S]uppose I desire a milk shake for lunch, 
recognize that the occasion is here, and am guilty 
of no irrationality.  Still, I might not drink a milk 
shake; for my desire for a milk shake still needs to 
be weighed against conflicting desires—say, my 
desire to lose weight.  My desire for a milk shake 
potentially influences what I do at lunchtime.  But 
in the normal course of events I still might not 
even try to drink a milk shake. 
 
In contrast, suppose that this morning I formed 
the intention to have a milk shake at lunch, 
lunchtime arrives, my intention remains, and 
nothing unexpected happens.  In such a case I do 
not normally need yet again to tote up the pros 
and cons concerning milk-shake drinking.  
Rather, in the normal course of events I will 
simply proceed to execute (or anyway, try to 
execute) my intention and order a milk shake.  My 
intention will not merely influence my conduct, it 
will control it.152 
 
151. Tim Schroeder, Desire, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(rev. ed. 2015),  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/desire/. 
152. MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON 15–
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Thus, intentions are committed to action in a controlling, 
executory way that desires are not.  Desires can influence, but 
“[a]s a conduct-controlling pro-attitude my intention involves a 
special commitment to action that ordinary desires do not.”153 
Having considered belief, desire, and intention in more 
detail, we can now ask: How do the actor’s will and trying fit into 
a case where someone voluntarily performs a basic action such 
as raising her arm?  Colin McGinn offers the following 
suggestion: 
 
[I]ntention cannot be analysed in terms of desire 
and/or belief, and willing cannot be reduced to 
intending . . . . Desire is unfettered by knowledge 
of what is practically possible, but intention needs 
to reckon with the practical facts of life, as these 
are seen by the agent.  Intending is what channels 
desire and belief toward the will; forming an 
intention is like putting the active faculty into 
gear, without yet depressing the accelerator.  But 
intending is not the same as willing. . . . [Y]ou can 
intend to do what you do not, in the event, will to 
do: you may intend to put a question to the 
distinguished speaker, but lose your nerve (will) 
at the last minute, though the intention may 
survive.  We can say . . . that to will something is 
for the state of intending to be ‘activated’ . . . for 
an intention to be activated is just for the agent to 
try to do what he intends  
. . . . Without the will, then, intentions would 
never get off the ground.  So the transition from  
. . . (desire and belief) to intention and thence to 
trying is a transition to genuinely distinct mental 
states or events, progressively closer, temporally 
and conceptually, to bodily action.154 
 
16 (Harvard Univ. Press 1999). 
153. Id. at 16. 
154. MCGINN, supra note 146, at 131-32.  McGinn’s picture seems, in 
principle, empirically falsifiable.  If we learn enough about how the human 
brain works (through scientific empirical investigation) such that it becomes 
60http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/1
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Two points about the trying aspect of a basic voluntary 
action deserve emphasis: (a) often, the trying is conscious to the 
agent, and (b) the trying is part of, instead of being the cause of, 
the basic action.  Turning first to a trying being conscious, the 
notion of an unconscious trying seems natural when the action 
being attempted is a complex action: 
 
[T]here are descriptions of what an agent is trying 
to do that the agent is unaware of—as when a 
psychoanalyst says that his patient, in losing a 
photograph of his father, was trying 
unconsciously to get rid of his father.  In such a 
case, we are describing the agent’s trying in terms 
of his reasons,155 and these can be unconscious.156 
 
But often, when the action is a basic action, the agent is 
conscious of trying to perform it.  When A tries, in the normal 
way, to raise her arm, A is often aware that she is trying to do 
so.  Of course, there are cases in which A tries to raise her arm 
without being aware that she is trying, especially when A 
successfully and almost effortlessly tries.  For example, imagine 
that someone asks A to raise her arm.  A then tries to raise her 
arm and succeeds.  A is aware of the request and of complying 
with the request.  But A might not, in addition, be distinctly and 
consciously aware of trying to comply with the request.  To A, it 
may seem as if she just effortlessly does what she was asked to 
do.  But even if in such a case A is not distinctly conscious of 
trying, A is nonetheless trying—there is a trying going on in 
addition to the arm movement.  In other words, every basic 
action includes a trying, even when the action is successful and 
thereby draws the actor’s attention away from the trying part of 
what she does. 
 
implausible to think that a human brain could enter into functional states that 
satisfy McGinn’s picture of how mental states cause voluntary actions, then 
the accuracy of the picture would be called into serious question. 
155. I would be inclined at this point in the passage to refer to unconscious 
desires, instead of reasons, to explain (without evaluating) the agent’s 
behavior. 
156. MCGINN, supra note 146, at 128. 
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As previously mentioned, the trying is also part of the basic 
action—the trying does not cause the action.  When A raises her 
arm: (i) A tries to raise her arm, and (ii) it rises.  Both the trying 
and the movement are components of the action: 
 
[T]he trying occurs, closely followed by the 
movement, these being related . . . as cause and 
effect; the [basic] action is . . . trying and 
movement taken together.  More precisely, the 
action is . . . composed of both the trying and the 
movement—or equivalently, is . . . identical with 
a complex event having these constituents.  Since 
the action has these two items as constituent 
components, it is neither caused by the trying nor 
the cause of the movement—for causal relations 
do not hold between events and their 
constituents.157 
 
In other words: The trying causes the arm to rise.  But the 
trying does not cause the basic action, and the basic action does 
not cause the arm to rise.  Instead, the trying and the arm’s 
rising compose the basic action.  All voluntary basic actions 
include, without being caused by, a trying.  At this point, most of 
the main elements of the anatomy of a voluntary basic action 
have been identified—belief, desire, volition, and trying 
(willing).  What remains is to insert the agent and then explain 
how the account might accommodate the reasons-
responsiveness of agent-causation.158  But before doing this in 
Part V.D, it is worth considering some of the advantages of 
including a trying as a part of a voluntary basic action.  These 
advantages indirectly bolster the claim that there are plausible 
versions of agent causalism. 
 
C. Advantages to Understanding Voluntary Basic Actions to 
Include Tryings 
 
157. Id. at 126. 
158. See supra Part IV.  Recall that accommodating reasons-
responsiveness was the challenge posed to agent causalism at the end of Part 
IV. 
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Adopting the position that a voluntary basic action always 
includes, as a distinct element, an exercise of will (a trying) has 
advantages.  R.A. Duff poses a hypothetical and broaches a 
question famously raised by Ludwig Wittgenstein.159  First, the 
hypothetical: 
 
Whether I move my arm depends on conditions 
outside my control: if those conditions are not 
satisfied (if my arm is paralyzed . . .), I might fail 
to move my arm, although . . . I try to move it.  I 
might even believe that I have moved my arm 
when it has not actually moved: this happens 
when someone’s arm has been anaesthetized, he 
is asked to shut his eyes and raise his arm, and 
the arm is held down.  This person has not been 
merely inactive.160 
 
Wittgenstein’s famous question was: “[W]hen ‘I raise my 
arm,’ my arm goes up.  And the problem arises: what  
is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes  
up from that fact that . . .  I raise my arm?”161 
How do we explain the active nature of the person with the 
anaesthetized arm?  And is there a way to answer Wittgenstein’s 
question that is related to how we explain that person’s active 
nature?  One straightforward way to do this is to say that the 
person was trying to raise his arm (trying to perform a basic 
action) and that what is left over when I subtract the fact that 
my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm is my trying 
to raise my arm. 
 
159. Duff ultimately argues against the idea that every basic action 
includes a distinctive trying.  See Duff, Acting, Trying, and Criminal Liability, 
supra note 8, at 75. 
160. Id. at 83-84.  One could modify the hypothetical so that the arm is 
not being held down and that the individual, without realizing it, has been 
administered a temporary arm paralytic.  Or maybe the anesthetic doubles as 
a paralytic, but the individual does not realize that.  Even in such a modified 
case, the individual is not merely inactive in the sense under consideration 
here. 
161. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS para. 621 (G. 
E. M. Anscombe trans., Basil Blackwell 1963). 
63
  
708 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  36:3 
In Duff’s example of the person who tries to raise his arm 
but fails, without realizing it, there is no basic action because 
there is no arm movement.  In the normal arm-raising case, 
there is the trying and the arm movement.  The trying causes 
the arm movement.  And the voluntary basic action comprises 
the trying causing the arm movement.  In the abnormal case of 
the man with the anesthetized arm, there is no basic action 
because only the trying happens—the arm movement part is 
missing because something interferes with the causal link 
between the trying and the arm. 
Consistent with Part V.B’s brief discussion of trying, and 
limiting our attention for the moment to basic actions, the 
following picture emerges: 
 
[A]ll [basic] actions . . . involve trying . . . . Trying 
is inherently active, and . . . [is] the psychological 
aspect of action.  We do not, of course, always say 
of someone who acts that he tried to do that which 
he did . . . . But this does not imply that it is false 
to claim that agents try to perform even their most 
effortless actions . . . . [T]here seems no difference, 
with respect to what is going on in you 
psychologically, between the normal case in which 
your arm rises as a result of your decision to raise 
it and the abnormal case in which, unknown to 
you, your arm has been paralyzed; yet in the latter 
case we would say that you did at least try to raise 
your arm—and your mental acts were no different 
in the former case . . . . [S]o we can legitimately 
claim that there is always an event of trying 
involved in any [even basic] action.162 
 
Adopting the view that tryings are distinct elements of 
every voluntary basic action also helps explain certain types of 
voluntary omissions.  Sometimes omissions have an agent-
controlled, voluntary nature.  “[A] guardsman who keeps himself 
from moving acts, but acts precisely by not moving his body.”163  
 
162. MCGINN,  supra note 146, at 123-24. 
163. Duff, Acting, Trying and Criminal Liability, supra note 8, at 83. 
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The active, voluntary nature of the guardsman is captured by 
the idea that he is, successfully, trying to keep his body still—
trying to not-move his body.  Tryings serve not just as the 
psychologically active components of voluntary actions but also 
as the psychologically active components of voluntary 
omissions.164  As explained, in the case of a voluntary arm-
raising, the trying and the arm’s rising are two components of 
the basic action, and the trying causes the arm movement.  In 
the case of a voluntary non-raising of an arm, the trying and the 
arm’s not rising are two components of the voluntary omission, 
and the trying causes the arm’s not rising.  (Contrast this last 
case with the previous case of the anesthetized arm that does 
not rise.  In the anesthetized arm case where the actor is trying 
to raise his arm, there is the trying and the arm’s not-rising.  But 
there, the trying does not cause the arm’s not-rising.  Instead, 
the causal explanation of the arm’s not-rising is that the 
anesthesia/paralytic interferes with the usual causal connection 
between what the actor tries to do with his arm and how his arm 
behaves.  So in the anesthetized arm case, there is an omission 
(to raise the arm), but the omission is not voluntary.) 
Adding tryings to the picture—distinct from beliefs, desires, 
and volitions—also helps with what might be referred to as the 
problem of wayward causal chains.  Donald Davidson raised this 
problem against the backdrop of a theory according to which it 
is an agent’s belief/desire pair that proximately causes body 
movements when she intentionally acts.  Davidson noted that, 
even if a belief/desire pair represents and causes a simple 
muscular movement, there is no guarantee that what happens 
is a voluntary, intentional action: 
 
Beliefs and desires that would rationalize an 
action if they caused it in the right way . . . may 
cause it in other ways.  If so, the action was not 
performed with the intention that we could have 
read off from the attitudes that caused it . . . . A 
 
164. This is not to suggest that an omission must be voluntary (include a 
trying) for the VAR to be satisfied.  For example, if the requisite mens rea is 
(criminal) negligence and the actus reus is defined in terms of an omission, 
then the VAR might be satisfied even if the defendant does not actively try to 
omit. 
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climber might want to rid himself of the weight 
and danger of holding another man on a rope, and 
he might know that by loosening his hold on the 
rope he could rid himself of the weight and 
danger.  This belief and want might so unnerve 
him as to cause him to loosen his hold, and yet it 
might be the case that he never chose to loosen his 
hold, nor did he do it intentionally.165 
 
Arguably, the VAR might not be satisfied if criminal charges 
were brought against the climber for the death of his climbing 
partner.166  Granted, his grip-loosening was not an entirely 
mindless reflex, an unconscious movement, or the result of 
hypnotic suggestion.  But something was not voluntary about 
what the climber did.  An official comment to the MPC 
emphasizes that “[t]here is sufficient difference between 
ordinary human activity and a reflex or a convulsion to make it 
desirable that they be distinguished for purposes of criminal 
responsibility by a term like ‘voluntary.’”167  Voluntary actions 
are supposed to be instances of “ordinary human activity.”  To 
assure that we have a genuine case of “ordinary human activity,” 
we should stipulate that the belief/desire pair causes the 
muscular movement in the “right way”168 and not via a wayward 
causal chain. 
But what is the “right way?”  Once we introduce tryings, it 
becomes natural to say that the VAR is not satisfied in the 
mountain-climber case because the climber never tried to let go.  
Causal chains are prevented from becoming wayward by having 
tryings situated within them.  Of course, this raises another 
 
165. Donald Davidson, Freedom to Act, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 
63, 79 (2d ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1980). 
166. I do not mean to suggest that criminal charges would be brought in 
a case like this. 
167. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and 
Revised Comments 1985). 
168. See Bishop, supra note 108, at 61.  Obviously, a defensible 
specification of what counts as the “right way” is necessary to solve the 
“wayward causal chain” problem and clarify exactly what makes for a 
voluntary act.  See also id. at 61-79 for an argument that the most promising 
strategy for solving the problem of wayward causal chains is to adopt agent 
causalism. 
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question.  How are tryings situated within causal chains to solve 
the problem of wayward causal chains and assure that the VAR 
is satisfied?  To answer this question, I turn now to completing 
the sketch of the anatomy of a voluntary action.  Doing this will 
suggest how tryings might solve the problem of wayward causal 
chains, and it will also suggest an answer to the remaining open 
question from Part IV: How might agent-causation be reasons-
responsive? 
 
D. How Agent-Causation Might be Reasons-Responsive 
 
How can we fit agents into our developing picture of 
voluntary actions to make agent-causation responsive to 
reasons?  To answer this question, perhaps a good way to begin 
is to reflect on what it is like to make an everyday decision 
voluntarily to act on the basis of conscious deliberation—on the 
basis of practical reasoning: 
 
When I decide . . . to go for a walk on a cool autumn 
evening, I am conscious of various factors at work 
. . . motivating me either to do so or to do 
something else instead.  And there are some 
courses of action which, while it is conceivable 
that I might choose to follow them  
. . . do not represent ‘genuine’ possibilities for me 
at that time, given my current mood, particular 
desires and beliefs, and, in some cases, long-
standing intentions of a general sort.  But within 
the framework of possibilities . . . that these . . . 
conative and cognitive factors set, it seems . . . to 
be up to me to decide which particular action I will 
undertake.  The decision I make is no mere vector 
sum of internal and external forces acting upon 
me during the process of deliberation . . . . Rather, 
I bring it about—directly, you might say—in 
response to the various considerations: I am the 
source of my own activity, not merely in a relative 
sense as the most proximate and salient locus of 
an unbroken chain of causal transactions leading 
up to this event, but fundamentally, in a way not 
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prefigured by what has gone before.169 
 
This passage partially describes what it is like to decide to 
voluntarily go for a walk as the result of deliberation—as the 
result of practical reasoning.  And it mentions a causal role that 
the agent herself plays in making that decision.  Further, the 
ultimate output of the agent’s deliberation is a physical action 
that the agent performs—going for a walk.  An ancient question 
is impressed upon us when we consider that physical actions are 
the ultimate outputs of episodes of practical reasoning: 
 
[H]ow is it that thought . . . is sometimes followed 
by action, sometimes not; sometimes by 
movement, sometimes not?  What happens seems 
parallel to the case of thinking and inferring about 
the immovable objects of science.  There the end is 
the truth seen (for, when one conceives the two 
premisses, one at once conceives and 
comprehends the conclusion), but here the two 
premisses result in a conclusion which is an 
action—for example, one conceives that every 
man ought to walk, one is a man oneself: 
straightway one walks; or that, in this case, no 
man should walk, one is a man: straightway one 
remains at rest.170 
 
This ancient question about practical reasoning arises 
largely because, in paradigmatic cases, practical reasoning’s 
inputs are psychological and logical, but its outputs are 
strikingly different—they are muscular actions. 
Practical reasoning is often distinguished from theoretical 
reasoning.  Theoretical reasoning might be considered less 
mysterious than practical reasoning because its outputs do not 
differ as dramatically from its inputs.  Both the inputs and the 
outputs are beliefs in cases of theoretical reasoning, which 
proceeds in the form of theoretical inferences.  It is important to 
 
169. O’Connor, Agent Causation, supra note 113, at 173. 
170. ARISTOTLE, ON THE MOTION OF ANIMALS 1 (A. S. L. Farquharson 
trans., Infomotions, Inc. 2001). 
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distinguish: (a) drawing a theoretical inference  and (b) a 
theoretical argument.  Making an inference is psychological as 
well as logical.  Drawing an inference is something that someone 
does; it is a psychological action.  A theoretical argument, in 
contrast, is a set of propositions, some of which are premises and 
one of which is the conclusion.  The relations between the 
propositions are not psychological; they are logical, or evidential.  
An argument is not something that someone does.  Of course, 
making an argument is something that someone does; it is a 
communicative act.  Also, when an argument is proffered and 
understood, there can be psychological effects, for example, the 
audience becomes convinced that the argument’s conclusion is 
true. 
Drawing a theoretical inference begins with the reasoner’s 
believing that an argument’s premises, at least, considered 
individually, are true.  The causal upshot is the reasoner’s 
coming to believe that the argument’s conclusion is true.  In 
theoretical inferences, the connection between the input and 
output beliefs is forged by the reasoner’s grasp of the logical or 
evidential relationship between the premises and conclusion.  To 
take a simple example, consider the following deductive 
syllogism: 
(1) All tortoises are mortal. 
(2) Socrates is a tortoise. 
Therefore, (3) Socrates is mortal. 
Imagine that the reasoner believes that (1) and (2) are true.  
John Bishop has suggested the following: 
 
When I infer that Socrates is mortal from my 
beliefs that Socrates is a tortoise and all tortoises 
are mortal, I do something.  It is clear that, when 
I make the inference, it is not the case that my 
believing that Socrates is a tortoise and my 
believing that all tortoises are mortal are jointly 
causally sufficient for my believing that Socrates 
is mortal.  When I make this inference, I consider 
the content of these two beliefs of mine, recognize 
their mutual relevance, and reason it out that 
Socrates is mortal.  This is not a very difficult 
task, yet it is conceivable that I should not carry 
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it out.  I might fail to grasp the validity of the form 
of argument I need to use, or, more likely, though 
I do believe that Socrates is a tortoise and that 
tortoises are mortal it happens that I never 
connect the two: the tortoisehood of Socrates and 
the mortality of tortoises never come together in 
the same train of thought.  Now, in this case, 
though we refuse to allow that my holding the 
premiss beliefs itself suffices causally for the 
formation of the conclusion belief, we do not deny 
that the premiss beliefs play some causal role.  
They are intrinsic to the inference which brings 
about the new belief.  It is the agent who makes 
the inference, and so that agent who causes his 
belief, but he does so only in virtue of holding the 
premiss beliefs to be true.171 
 
This passage suggests that, even in the case of coming to 
believe that Socrates is mortal by drawing a theoretical 
inference, the agent causes something.  The agent causes her 
own coming-to-believe the conclusion; the agent herself causes 
an event.  In other words, it seems that agent-causation might 
play a role not only in voluntary action, but also as a part of 
theoretical reasoning.  Of course, the agent’s premise-beliefs also 
play a crucial causal, and logical, role.  We have a picture in 
which the agent herself is inserted as a causal factor, along and 
in concert with her intentional mental states.  And the agent is 
exercising her agent-causal power, to draw an inference, in a 
reasons-responsive manner.  In combination, the fact that all 
tortoises are mortal and the fact that Socrates is a tortoise are 
reasons to believe that Socrates is mortal.  And when the agent 
draws the theoretical inference, she is responding to those 
reasons. 
Even if agent-causation is operative in theoretical reasoning 
as well as in voluntary action, there is a certain degree of control 
that seems lacking in connection with reasoning, at least in 
comparison to one’s control over one’s basic muscular actions.  
Granted, I do seem to have control over the trying aspects of 
 
171. Bishop, supra note 108, at 77-78. 
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performing mental actions, like drawing an inference.  It is up 
to me how hard I try, on a given occasion, to recognize logical or 
conceptual relationships.  But, I routinely seem to lack control 
over what I come to believe as a result of such efforts.  (Contrast: 
I do not routinely lack control over where my arm goes as a result 
of trying to raise it.) 
For example, imagine that I try to follow a proof of the 
Pythagorean Theorem and succeed.  I see that the requisite 
logical and conceptual relationships hold between the proof’s 
premises and conclusion, and I see that the premises are 
undoubtedly true.  As a result, I come to believe the Pythagorean 
Theorem.  But now I am, so to speak, stuck with the new belief 
whether I like it or not.  Having drawn the inference, I now 
cannot help myself epistemologically.  Unless my memory fades, 
I cannot rid myself of that new belief, no matter how badly I 
might wish that the Pythagorean Theorem were false.  
Empirical beliefs are also often involuntary in roughly this 
sense.  I believe that there is a keyboard on which I am typing 
right now.  Of course, I could contemplate bizarre falsifying 
hypotheses in an effort to call that belief into doubt.  Maybe I am 
having a vivid dream and am in fact abed, far away from any 
keyboards.  But this, at most, reduces my certitude a little.  I 
just cannot get myself to not believe that I am typing on a 
keyboard now. 
Bracketing this seeming difference between our control over 
our beliefs and our control over our voluntary basic muscular 
actions, Bishop’s sketch of how reasons-responsive agent-
causation is operative in theoretical reasoning suggests how 
such causation might fit into practical reasoning leading 
ultimately to voluntary action.  Someone might understand a 
practical inference as having beliefs as inputs and an intention 
as an output.  To take a simple example, imagine that A 
promises B that she will meet B at the bus station at 3:00 PM.  
Consider the following series of propositions: 
 
(1) A promised B that she will meet B at the bus station at 
3:00 PM. 
(2) A should keep her promises. 
(3) To get to the bus station by 3:00 PM, the only means 
available to A is to ride her bicycle. 
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(4) A rides her bicycle to the bus station. 
How might A’s drawing a practical inference work in this 
case?  A believes (1), (2), and (3).  That is, A has three beliefs, 
whose propositional contents are (1), (2), and (3), respectively.  A 
recognizes that (1), (2), and (3), considered together, are 
practical reasons that count in favor of riding her bicycle to the 
bus station.  A reasons it out and forms the intention to ride her 
bicycle to the bus station—A forms an intention whose 
propositional content is (4).  This is not a very difficult task, yet 
it is conceivable that A not carry it out.  A might fail to grasp the 
mutual relevance of the practical reasons.  She might believe 
that she made the promise, believe that she should keep her 
promises, and believe that her only chance to get to the bus 
station by 3:00 PM is to ride her bicycle.  But she might never 
connect the three in a unified train of thought.  Although A’s 
holding the premise-beliefs does not itself suffice causally for the 
formation of the intention to ride her bicycle to the bus station, 
the premise-beliefs play a causal role.  They are intrinsic to the 
inference that brings about the intention.  It is the agent who 
makes the inference, and so that agent who causes her intention, 
but she does so only in virtue of holding the premise-beliefs to be 
true. 
Thus, reasons-responsive agent-causation can play an 
indispensable role in the formation of intentions (volitions).  But 
this does not get us all the way to voluntary action, because “you 
can intend to do what you do not, in the event, will to do.”172  
“Intending is what channels desire and belief toward the will; 
forming an intention is like putting the active faculty into gear, 
without yet depressing the accelerator.”173  To get all the way to 
voluntary action, the agent must do one more thing—depress the 
accelerator.  In other words, the agent must try.  And, as 
discussed previously, when the agent tries, she agent-causes the 
trying.  Further, if the trying causes a bodily movement, then 
the agent also voluntarily agent-causes a basic action, composed 
of the trying and the bodily movement.  And when the agent 
voluntarily performs the complex action of riding her bicycle to 
the bus station, she does so by voluntarily performing numerous 
 
172. MCGINN, supra note 146, at 132. 
173. Id. 
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basic actions. 
The preceding paints a picture of voluntary action that the 
actor performs on the basis of practical reasoning.  According to 
this picture, agent-causation is indispensable.  First, agent-
causation comes into play in the actor’s reasons-responsive 
formation of a volition.  Without the volition, there is no 
voluntary act.  So the reasons-responsive agent-causation is 
essential to the provenance of the voluntary act.  Second, 
because the volition, standing alone, is insufficient to cause the 
voluntary action, agent-causation kicks in a second time.  The 
agent exercises her will—she tries.  If the trying successfully 
causes the intended muscular movement, then the agent 
voluntarily acts—the voluntary basic act consists of the trying 
and the muscular movement.  And all voluntary actions are 
either basic or they are done by performing basic muscular 
actions.  This is how agent-causation ultimately leading to 
voluntary action might be reasons-responsive.174 
This picture also suggests how tryings might solve the 
problem of wayward causal chains.  The trying that solves the 
problem of wayward causal chains fits in after the formation of 
the intention.  An agent’s beliefs, desires, fears, etc. may 
influence what she does, even after she forms the intention.  But 
the intention, being executory, puts the agent’s will into gear, so 
to speak.  And once that happens, it is up to the agent to exercise 
her will, (i.e., to agent-cause a trying).  The intention does not 
deterministically event-cause the agent to exercise her will (i.e., 
the intention is not causally sufficient for her to try).  When a 
trying is situated between the agent’s mental states and her 
action in this way, the link between the mental states and the 
action is not wayward, and the action is voluntary. 
 
VI. Agent-Causal Retributivism and Justifying Applications of 
the VAR 
 
As this paper has argued, for retributivist justifications of 
the VAR to be plausible, agent causalism must be true.  Parts IV 
 
174. Thus, the challenge posed by the second objection to agent causalism 
at the end of Part IV has been met (at least, well enough that agent causalism 
emerges as plausible). 
73
  
718 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  36:3 
and V have been dedicated largely to making agent causalism 
plausible.  But many think that agent causalism is false.  And if 
it is false, then this paper’s main thesis implies that 
retributivism cannot contribute to justifying the VAR—the 
fundamental predicate of legal criminal liability.  Before 
concluding, it is worth considering whether retributivism would 
have difficulty justifying the VAR even if agent causalism were 
true.  To do this, it is helpful to consider three kinds of cases 
recently discussed by Gideon Yaffe. 
Yaffe has argued that the VAR is justified because it assures 
that what he terms the “Requirement of Correspondence” is 
satisfied when criminal liability is imposed upon a defendant: 
 
When a defendant is shown to be guilty of a crime, 
he is shown to have performed certain acts with 
certain results in certain circumstances . . . . And 
he is shown to have been in certain mental states 
. . . . But . . . there is an additional requirement 
that is so rarely at issue as to go unmentioned 
most of the time: the defendant’s actions must 
correspond with his mental states.175 
 
In brief, the Requirement of Correspondence is that the 
defendant’s mens rea and actus reus must correspond in the 
right way for the state to impose legal punishment.  And the 
VAR guarantees that this requirement is satisfied: 
 
Voluntary acts matter to criminal liability . . . 
because without them we lack the link between 
objectionable mental states and objectionable acts 
that is required to be justified in punishing for the 
package of mental states and conduct that crimes 
. . . consist in.  There is mens rea and there is actus 
reus; but without a voluntary act, there is not the 
link between the two that is required for desert of 
punishment for the conjunction.176 
 
 
175. Yaffe, supra note 2, at 183. 
176. Id. at 184. 
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Yaffe refers to this way of substantiating the VAR as the 
“Manifestation of Mens Rea Rationale”: 
 
Under [this rationale], the VAR is a byproduct of 
the idea that mens rea is an essential part of 
criminal liability.  It is because we already think 
that people should not be punished in the absence 
of a showing of mens rea . . . that we are barred, 
for moral reasons, from punishing them in the 
absence of a voluntary act.  Mens rea is essential, 
but it isn’t relevant unless it’s manifested.  And it 
isn’t manifested unless there’s a voluntary act.  To 
punish . . . in the absence of a voluntary act is 
morally no different from punishing in the 
absence of mens rea, and that is unacceptable.177 
 
And Yaffe argues that the Manifestation of Mens Rea 
Rationale squares with three types of cases in which the VAR 
plays a decisive role. 
 
A. Cases Featuring Complex Unconscious Bodily Movements 
 
In the first type of case, there is no criminal liability because 
unconscious178 bodily movements do not count as voluntary acts 
for the purposes of the VAR.  As one court has clarified, “[t]o 
constitute a defense, unconsciousness need not rise to the level 
of coma or inability to walk or perform manual movements.”179  
A striking example is provided by a leading Canadian case, R. v. 
Parks.180  In Parks, the defendant drove his car about twenty-
three kilometers from his residence to his in-laws’ home.181  He 
then attacked his in-laws while they were asleep, killing one of 
them.182  Afterward, he drove his car to a nearby police station, 
 
177. Id. 
178. Some might distinguish “unconscious” mental states from 
“subconscious” mental states. This paper attempts no such distinction. 
Hereafter, I shall use only the term “unconscious.” 
179. People v. Halverson, 165 P.3d 512, 539 (Cal. 2007). 
180. R. v. Parks,  2 S.C.R. 871 (Can. 1992). 
181. Id. at  871. 
182. Id. 
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telling the police what he had done.183  The defendant was 
acquitted.184  He successfully argued that because he was 
sleepwalking through the entire incident, he should not be 
subject to criminal liability.185  On appeal, the Supreme Court of 
Canada determined that the defendant indeed should have been 
acquitted because the record indicated that he was in a state of 
“non-insane automatism” during the incident: 
 
Automatism, although spoken of as a “defen[s]e”, 
is conceptually a sub-set of the voluntariness 
requirement, which in turn is part of the actus 
reus component of criminal liability.  An 
involuntary act, including one committed in an 
automatistic condition entitles an accused to an 
unqualified acquittal, unless the automatistic 
condition stems from a disease of the mind  
that has rendered the accused insane.186  
 
The court added: 
 
[Canada’s] system of justice is predicated on the 
notion that only those who act voluntarily should 
be punished under the criminal law.  Here, no 
compelling policy factors preclude a finding that 
the accused’s condition was one of non-insane 
automatism.187 
 
How might an agent-causal, retributivist justification of the 
VAR handle such cases?  In the paradigmatic agent-causal 
situation outlined above: (i) the agent forms a volition; (ii) the 
volition enables the agent’s will to become active; (iii) the agent 
 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 872. 
185. Id. at  871-82. 
186. Parks, 2 S.C.R. at 872. 
187. Id. at 874.  Cf. Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183, 193 (1879) 
(granting the defendant a new trial because he had not been allowed to prove 
that he suffered from somnambulism) (“Our law only punishes for overt acts 
done by responsible moral agents. If the prisoner was unconscious when he 
killed the deceased, he cannot be punished for that act . . . .”). 
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exercises her will—she tries; and (iv) assuming that her trying 
causes her body to move, she herself thereby causes an action.  
When (i)–(iv) happen, a defendant exercises the requisite 
control, which, in combination with the mens rea and the 
remainder of the actus reus being satisfied, makes her deserving 
of legal punishment. 
The agent-causal retributivist justification of the VAR 
would account for cases where the defendant acts unconsciously 
if it turned out that in such cases the defendant lacked the 
control requisite for desert.  Assuming that he was unconscious 
the entire time, did Parks lack that sort of control when he killed 
one of his in-laws?  The agent causalist might argue that Parks 
lacked the requisite control because he did not, in the technical 
sense of the agent-causal picture outlined in Part V, try to do any 
of the things that he unconsciously did during his sleepwalking 
episode.  This argument relies on the following principle: 
 
(P)  The trying element of agent-causal voluntary 
action is missing in any case in which a defendant 
is unconscious of what she is doing. 
 
Initially, this agent-causal explanation may seem very 
counterintuitive.  (Surely, for example, Parks tried to drive to 
his in-laws’ home.  If he did not even try, how could he have 
managed to arrive there by car?)  It is important to note, 
however, that (P) uses the term trying in a technical sense.  As 
elaborated previously: a trying is a mental event distinct from 
other types of states such as beliefs, desires, fears, and volitions; 
a trying plays a particular functional role in the context of a 
normal voluntary action; a trying is an event that is agent-
caused; a trying is a component of, but not the cause of, a basic 
action; and so forth.  If we lose sight of this, then of course it may 
seem absurd to say that Parks did not even try to drive to his in-
laws’ home. 
But with the technical meaning of trying firmly in mind, is 
(P) plausible?  The issue here is not whether the trying itself is 
conscious.  As previously explained, sometimes an actor is not 
distinctly conscious of trying to do X but instead is conscious only 
of doing X.  (The previous example involved someone raising her 
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arm upon request.)188  But as also explained, in such cases the 
actor is still trying to do X.  (The actor was still trying to raise 
her arm.)  But what if the actor is unconscious of doing X?  (P) 
does not imply merely that the agent is also not conscious of 
trying to do X.  According to (P), in such a case there is no trying 
for the agent to be conscious of. 
If (P) is true—if there is no trying in cases, such as Parks, 
involving complex unconscious bodily movements—then how 
can the complexity of the bodily movements be accounted for?  
What Parks did was fairly elaborate.  He got into his car; turned 
on the ignition; drove about twenty-three kilometers to a 
destination where two people he knew personally were located; 
and so on.  That sort of behavior evinces rationality.  The agent 
causalist could account for the complexity the same way an 
event causalist might.  For example, Yaffe describes the conduct 
of Huey Newton, who defended himself in court by arguing that 
he was unconscious when he fatally shot a police officer:189 
 
Newton’s finger movements on the trigger were 
not likely to be purely reflexive; they were clearly 
goal directed.  Newton seems to have been aiming 
the gun at the officer, and so must have been 
mentally representing a particular goal, namely 
to shoot the officer, a mental representation that 
was involved in guiding his bodily movements.190 
 
To explain what Newton did, we need to treat him as an 
intentional system.  An intentional system is “a system whose 
behavior can be (at least sometimes) explained and predicted by 
relying on ascriptions to the system of beliefs and desires (and 
hopes, fears, intentions, hunches . . . .).”191  Intentional states, 
beliefs, desires, volitions, etc., play crucial roles in explaining 
how intentional systems behave.  An agent causalist can avail 
herself of such states just as an event causalist can.  An agent 
causalist could consistently hold that intentional states operate 
 
188. See supra pp. 162-63. 
189. See People v. Newton, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394 (Ct. App. 1970). 
190. Yaffe, supra note 2, at 176. 
191. Daniel Dennett, Intentional Systems, 68 J. PHIL. 87, 87 (1971). 
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deterministically in cases of complex unconscious behavior.  In 
such cases, the agent herself is causally inert because she is 
asleep.  But her rich, variegated, causally-complex economy of 
unconscious intentional states is not inert.  Because the agent 
herself is inert, she lacks the control requisite for desert.  In this 
way, an agent causalist retributive justification of the VAR could 
be consistent with not imposing criminal liability for complex 
unconscious conduct. 
 
B. Cases Featuring Certain Omissions 
 
In the second type of case, there is criminal liability even 
though there is no voluntary act because the defendant is guilty 
of a certain sort of omission.  Certain omissions are equivalent 
to voluntary acts for the purposes of the VAR.  A good example 
is provided by People v. Manon.192  In Manon, the defendant’s 
appeal from a conviction for criminally negligent homicide and 
endangering the welfare of a child was denied.193  Her infant son 
had died due to neglect.194  The court emphasized that 
“[c]riminal liability may . . . be based upon an omission, if such 
omission is the failure to perform a legally imposed duty such as 
parents’ nondelegable affirmative duty to provide their children 
with adequate medical care.”195 
How might an agent-causal retributivist justification of the 
VAR handle such cases?  When a crime’s actus reus features an 
omission, there are two main possibilities depending on what 
sort of mens rea is required for the crime.  If the requisite mens 
rea is purpose, then the agent causalist might insist that the 
actus reus’s omission, a state of affairs, be caused by the agent 
via a trying, as elaborated previously.  Recall the case of the 
guardsman who actively refrains from moving.196  In that case, 
the guardsman agent-caused his not-moving.  If that sort of 
 
192. People v. Manon, 640 N.Y.S.2d 318 (App. Div. 1996), leave to appeal 
denied, 673 N.E.2d 1248 (N.Y. 1996). 
193. Id. 
194. See id. at 319. 
195. Id. at 320 (quoting People v. Steinberg, 595 N.E.2d 845, 847 (N.Y. 
1992)). 
196. See supra p. 166. 
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omission were a crime,197 then perhaps the most natural mens 
rea would be purpose.  The guardsman would be guilty of this 
crime because he purposely not-moved.  In general, if a penal 
code defined crimes in terms of purposeful omissions, then the 
agent-causal retributivist would have no problem defending the 
VAR, which would be interpreted as requiring a trying before 
criminal liability was imposed.  Only when the defendant tried 
to omit would she exercise the control necessary for moral 
responsibility, and therefore for desert, as least as to crimes of 
omission requiring that type of mens rea. 
But if the mens rea of a crime of omission were knowledge, 
recklessness, or criminal negligence or if the crime of omission 
were a strict liability crime, then the defendant’s trying would 
presumably no longer need to be the cause of the omission.  Take, 
for example, the penal statutes that Cindy Manon violated when 
she neglected her infant son: 
 
A person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide 
when, with criminal negligence, he causes the 
death of another person. N.Y.198 
 
A person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a 
child when . . . . Being a parent . . . he or she fails 
. . . to exercise reasonable diligence in the control 
of such child to prevent him or her from becoming 
. . . a “neglected child” . . . . 199 
 
Section 125.10 required only criminal negligence for guilt.200  
And because Manon was a parent, § 260.10 did not require that 
she have any particular mens rea, beyond that possibly 
suggested by “reasonable diligence,” to be guilty.201  Manon was 
the victim’s parent, and she had at least two legal duties toward 
her son—a duty to not negligently cause his death202 and a duty 
 
197. Of course, it is farfetched to think that such an omission would ever 
actually be a crime. 
198. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10 (McKinney 2016). 
199. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10. 
200. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10. 
201. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10. 
202. Manon’s having this particular duty did not depend on her being the 
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to exercise reasonable diligence to prevent him from being 
neglected.  Manon flouted both duties.  And her flouting them 
had nothing in particular to do with her exercise of an agent-
causal ability to cause crucial omissions.  So how might an 
agent-causal retributivist justify the law’s position that the VAR 
is satisfied in such cases? 
To see how, first consider Yaffe’s explanation of how the 
Manifestation of Mens Rea Rationale addresses such omissions: 
 
[W]hat we do not do often manifests our 
objectionable mental states just as much as what 
we do do even if there is no volition present.  The 
mental state of disregarding one’s child’s welfare 
is manifested by the failure to do that which the 
child’s welfare requires that one do.  However, in 
such cases, there need be no volition to serve as 
causal intermediary between the morally and 
criminally relevant mental state— . . . the state of 
“disregard”—and the failure to do as one ought.  
While that failure may need to be caused by the 
prior mental state for the failure to manifest itself 
in the morally relevant way, such causation does 
not require volitional intermediaries.203 
 
The mental state featured in Yaffe’s account is a “state of 
disregard.”204  (We can put knowledge and recklessness aside for 
the moment, since disregarding one’s child does not require 
knowledge or recklessness.)  Thus, Yaffe seems to treat 
negligence, or perhaps even strict liability, as a type of mental 
state—it seems that disregarding negligently, or disregarding, 
period, is supposed to count as being in a type of mental state.  
This seems reasonable, since negligence and strict liability can 
be considered culpability (“mens rea”) states, and “mens rea” 
translates to “guilty mind.”205  But unlike recklessness, 
knowledge, or purpose, which require conscious psychological 
states, negligence and strict liability do not: 
 
parent of the victim. 
203. Yaffe, supra note 2, at 187–88. 
204. Id. 
205. Mens Rea, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 999 (7th ed. 1999). 
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Properly understood, the principal mental state 
concepts do not reflect a single hierarchy of legal 
significance.  Rather, they conceal two distinct 
mental state hierarchies, of desire and belief, as 
well as a third category, of conduct, which does not 
essentially involve mental states. . . . Culpable 
conduct includes . . . gross negligence.206 
 
In other words, negligence and strict liability are types of 
mens rea, but they are not types of mental, in the sense of 
psychological, states.  For example, the objective, counterfactual 
nature of the MPC’s definition of negligence reinforces that 
negligence is not a mental state: 
 
A person acts negligently with respect to a 
material element of an offense when he should be 
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the material element exists or will result from his 
conduct.  The risk must be of such a nature and 
degree that the actor’s failure to perceive it, 
considering the nature and purpose of his conduct 
and the circumstances known to him, involves a 
gross deviation from the standard of care that a 
reasonable person would observe in the actor’s 
situation.207 
 
Mental, psychological, states are at most indirectly involved 
or implied—the purpose of the defendant’s conduct and the 
defendant’s knowledge of surrounding circumstances.  But these 
serve only to elaborate aspects of a hypothetical situation that a 
reasonable person is placed in.  Regardless of a defendant’s 
actual psychological states, she is negligent when she fails to do 
what a reasonable person would do.  And a standard definition 
of a strict liability crime reinforces that strict liability is not a 
 
206. Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 
464 (1992).  Simons also explicitly counts strict liability as a “Conduct” state 
that is “not a true mental state.” Id. at 465 tbl. 2. 
207. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1985). 
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mental state either: “A crime that does not require a mens rea 
element.”208  Here, strict liability is not even a sort of mens rea 
that does not require any psychological states. 
The Manifestation of Mens Rea Rationale can handle 
negligence and strict-liability omissions because the mens rea 
might still cause the omission and thereby become manifest in 
the omission.  But the causing and the manifestation would have 
nothing in particular to do with the defendant’s actual 
psychology or the bearing that her psychology had, if any, on her 
control or moral responsibility.  A state of negligent disregard 
might in some sense cause the defendant’s failure to perform a 
legal duty.  And a state of, perhaps non-negligent, disregard also 
might in some sense cause her failure to perform a legal duty.  
In negligence and strict liability omission cases, we might say 
that the mens rea causes, and becomes manifest in, the omission 
by constituting, part or all of, the omission.  To offer an example 
for analogical purposes: A’s sister’s having a baby caused A to 
become an aunt.  The sister’s having a baby constitutes A’s 
becoming an aunt—the cause and effect are not logically 
independent.  One might also, loosely, say that the sister’s 
having a baby is manifested in A’s becoming an aunt. 
But for the agent-causal retributivist, the mere 
manifestation of mens rea in this causal-logical sense is not the 
crucial justificatory point.  For a retributivist, the crucial point 
is always whether the defendant deserves punishment.  Since 
the defendant’s actual psychology and agent-causal control are 
irrelevant in negligence and strict liability omission cases, it 
would seem that for the agent-causal retributivist to justify the 
VAR in such cases, she must explain how a defendant could 
deserve punishment without relying on or referring to the 
defendant’s actual psychological states or the degree of the 
defendant’s agent-causal control. 
An agent-causal retributivist could offer such an 
explanation, however.  A defendant could deserve punishment 
for an omission if it seems justifiable for her to be subject to 
punitive liability independently of whether she, as an agent, 
tries, in the technical sense, to do, or to not-do, anything.  Only 
certain omissions are ever included in the actus reus of a crime.  
 
208. Strict-Liability Crime, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 378 (7th ed. 1999). 
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And those omissions are failures to perform legally imposed 
duties.  If in all cases in which the law imposes such duties it 
seems plausible that failing in the duty would ground moral 
responsibility and desert, then a retributivist, whether an agent 
causalist or not, would be able to justify including some 
omissions within the VAR.  (Although the retributivist might 
complain that it is misleading to include omissions within a 
principle called the “Voluntary Act Requirement.” Maybe it 
would be better to enact a separate “Limited Class of Omissions 
Requirement” and then insist that the fundamental predicate of 
criminal liability would be satisfying either the VAR or the 
separate “omissions” requirement.) 
In Manon, the defendant was the infant’s mother.209  She 
had not given him up for adoption, and she had not given up her 
parental rights.210  It may seem plausible that she deserves 
punishment for neglecting her son even if she did not try to 
neglect him.  To offer another example, in Commonwealth v. 
Levesque,211 the court reversed a dismissal of the defendants’ 
indictment for manslaughter.  The defendants were alleged to 
have (a) accidentally started a warehouse fire and (b) failed to 
report the fire.212  Eventually, six fire fighters perished in the 
blaze.213  The defendants’ indictment was dismissed because the 
defendants successfully argued that they “had no legal duty to 
report the fire and [that] their failure to act did not satisfy the 
standard of wanton and reckless conduct required for 
manslaughter charges.”214  The Levesque court reversed the 
dismissal, however: 
 
It is true that, in general, one does not have a duty 
to take affirmative action[;] however, a duty to 
prevent harm to others arises when one creates a 
dangerous situation, whether that situation was 
created intentionally or negligently.215 
 
209. People v. Manon, 640 N.Y.S.2d 318, 319 (App. Div. 1996). 
210. See generally id. 
211. Commonwealth v. Levesque, 766 N.E.2d 50 (Mass. 2002). 
212. Id. at 53. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. at 56. 
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Where a defendant’s failure to exercise reasonable 
care to prevent the risk he created is reckless and 
results in death, the defendant can be convicted of 
involuntary manslaughter. Public policy requires 
that “one who creates, by his own conduct . . . a 
grave risk of death or injury to others has a duty 
and obligation to alleviate the danger.”216 
 
It may seem plausible that the Levesque defendants deserve 
punishment for not taking steps to prevent the risk that they 
created even if they did not try not-to-prevent it.  Generally, as 
long as the legal duty imposed is similar to those imposed in 
Manon and Levesque, the agent-causal retributivist can explain 
how a defendant could, by omission, satisfy the VAR and deserve 
punishment.  And this could be done without relying on or 
referring to the defendant’s actual psychological states217 or the 
degree of the defendant’s agent-causal control. 
 
C. Habitual Action Cases 
 
In the third type of case, there is criminal liability even 
though the defendant acts out of habit.  Habitual actions count 
as voluntary acts for the purposes of the VAR.  As MPC § 2.02(d) 
clarifies, not counting as a voluntary act for the purposes of the 
VAR is “a bodily movement that . . . is not a product of the effort 
or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual.”  This 
suggests that a habitual bodily movement is a product of the 
effort or determination of the actor and is therefore a voluntary 
act. 
Yaffe devises a hypothetical: 
 
 
216. Id. at 57 (citations omitted). 
217. In the case of a reckless omission some reference to the defendant’s 
actual psychology would be necessary because “[a] person acts recklessly with 
respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will 
result from his conduct . . . .”  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (Official Draft 
and Explanatory Notes 1985) (emphasis added).  But the crucial point remains 
that the defendant’s agent-causal power would be irrelevant. 
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Consider a defendant who has been trained by the 
military to spin around and fire immediately, and 
without thinking, on a threat behind him.  This 
behavior has become, thanks to his training, 
habitual. Is he to be held guilty of a crime when, 
at the local firing range, he spins and fires on a 
person behind him who yells something 
threatening? . . . The bodily movements in cases 
such as this are routinely taken to provide an 
acceptable basis for criminal liability.218 
 
Yaffe points out that in such a case, a court would assume 
that the defendant willed the habitual behavior, even if the court 
was unsure whether the behavior was willed.  As Yaffe explains: 
 
Normally, our ignorance about a feature of 
pertinence to criminal liability is enough to supply 
reasonable doubt, and thus enough to support an 
acquittal.  But not in habitual action cases.  If 
there is reasonable doubt about whether the 
defendant’s bodily movement was voluntary 
deriving from the fact that it is habitual, that 
reasonable doubt fails to undermine the case for 
guilt.  We treat habitual bodily movements . . . as 
though they were voluntary acts in the legal 
sense, even though we have no idea whether they 
are in fact.219 
 
Thus, habitual action cases depart from the fundamental 
legal principle that requisites for criminal liability must be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt before punishment is 
imposed.  Even if it seemed ludicrous to suggest that a defendant 
acted voluntarily in any usual sense of the term voluntarily, 
acting on the basis of habit would dispositively establish 
voluntary action for legal purposes.  And as Yaffe further 
clarifies, courts will also consider the VAR satisfied in habitual 
action cases without regard to whether the defendant was at 
 
218. Yaffe, supra note 2, at 177. 
219. Id. 
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fault in being in a situation where his habit might be “triggered” 
and cause harmful results: 
 
The defendant in [the firing range] case . . . need 
not be shown to have been at fault for being in the 
circumstances in which he found himself, nor 
would the behaviors that got him there need to be 
shown to have been voluntary.  The mere fact . . . 
that the relevant bodily movements were the 
product of habit is sufficient to show there to be 
compliance with the VAR in assigning a guilty 
verdict.220 
 
To modify the firing range case to challenge the idea that 
habit should always automatically establish voluntariness, 
imagine that the conditioning that ingrained the soldier’s 
shooting habit was intense and irresistible.  We could imagine a 
process similar to the conditioning not to commit harmful acts 
imposed on Alex DeLarge in Stanley Kubrik’s movie, “A 
Clockwork Orange.”221  The soldier volunteers to be subjected to 
this “rewiring” to empower him to complete vital military 
missions that save thousands of lives.  Upon retirement from the 
military, knowing of the potential danger his habit poses, he 
never goes near firearms.  He assiduously avoids any situation 
in which his latent automatic response might be triggered. 
One day, some evil masterminds decide to kill their nemesis, 
Victor, in an elaborate way.  So they drug and kidnap both Victor 
and the habituated soldier, taking both to the local firing range.  
They put a loaded gun in the soldier’s hand, and they place 
Victor behind the soldier.  Very close to Victor’s head, they 
position a speaker ready to project a pre-recorded sound that the 
masterminds know will trigger the soldier’s ingrained, 
automatic habit.  Immediately after the drugs wear off and both 
kidnap victims fully come to, the masterminds play the 
 
220. Id. at 183. 
221. In this movie, Alex commits anti-social acts.  He is caught and 
eventually released back into society, but only after having undergone an 
intense regimen of conditioning involving drugs and other invasive techniques, 
which renders him violently ill whenever he tries to commit further anti-social 
acts. 
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recording remotely.  The rest of the hypothetical is the same as 
Yaffe’s.  The soldier spins and fires, killing Victor.  If the soldier 
is tried for homicide, then the court will rule that the VAR is 
satisfied.  This is not to say that the soldier ultimately will be 
found guilty.  But if he is acquitted, it will not be because the 
VAR was not satisfied. 
How might an agent-causal retributivist justification of the 
VAR handle such a case?  The agent causalist faces a significant 
difficulty here.  The habit of the militarily-trained defendant 
was apparently ingrained to the point where he lacked control 
over spinning and firing.  The most straightforward agent 
causalist assessment would be that the VAR should not be 
considered satisfied because the defendant did not cause his 
conduct.  Instead, his training took over and made him do what 
did in an event-causal, deterministic manner.  Essentially, the 
masterminds used the soldier as a weapon.  The soldier was no 
more responsible, morally, than the gun was. He therefore 
lacked desert: 
 
Under one construal, habitual actions are simply 
“triggered” by perception of the environment. It is 
because he hears something threatening behind 
him that the soldier . . . spins and fires. But given 
that it is not in his control that he should hear the 
threat, it is not under his control that he should 
spin and fire on the person who issued it.222 
 
It is tempting to argue that, at least usually, there is no 
problem treating habitual actions as voluntary.  For example, 
imagine that Fred repeatedly drives his car quickly through a 
fairly remote intersection to save time.223  He goes to work at 
2:00 AM, and for years there has never been anyone else on the 
road then.  Fred’s habit regarding that intersection has become 
virtually automatic.  Then one night someone crosses that 
intersection on foot a little after 2:00 AM.  Fred notices her, but 
only a couple of moments before getting to the intersection.  
 
222. Yaffe, supra note 2, at 181. 
223. This example is a modified version of an example in Yaffe, supra note 
2, at 174. 
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Usually, he would be able to stop in time, but Fred’s habit kicks 
in, and the pedestrian is run over.  If Fred is charged with a 
crime, then presumably he will not be able successfully to defend 
by arguing that the VAR was not satisfied.  And even in an 
extreme, contrived scenario such as the modified firing range 
case, some other principle of criminal law would prevent the 
soldier from being found guilty.224  From a pragmatic point of 
view, it is acceptable to pretend that the soldier voluntarily spun 
and fired at Victor as long as, in the end, the soldier is not found 
guilty of a crime. 
Insofar as we care about punishing persons only when it is 
the right thing to do, this pragmatic argument does reasonably 
well.  By treating habitual actions as per se voluntary, we get 
things right, vis-à-vis voluntariness, most of the time, and we 
never punish someone who does not voluntarily act.  So for 
practical purposes, we can defend the law’s deviation from 
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt of any factor 
pertinent to criminal liability. 
But this approach is second-best.  When applying and 
justifying a doctrine as fundamental as the VAR, it should 
matter not just that we wind up getting the right answer as to 
guilt or innocence.  It should also matter that we get the right 
answer for the right reason.  At stake is justifying not just 
coercive governmental intrusion into the lives of criminals that 
causes them suffering.  Punishment hurts criminals on purpose.  
Ideally, we should have a good justificatory reason behind every 
aspect of doing that.  And treating the soldier as if he acted 
voluntarily would be based on a falsehood.225 
Consider Yaffe’s account of how the Manifestation of Mens 
Rea Rationale handles habitual action cases in general: 
 
224. Perhaps the soldier would not satisfy the requisite mens rea. 
225. But consider: There is a significant cost savings in habitual action 
cases if no proof is required that the habit involved leaves the defendant 
sufficiently in control.  Requiring proof of other elements of mens rea and actus 
reus is already expensive, and those requirements afford the defendant 
significant protection against wrongful conviction. (I wish to thank David A. 
Simon for suggesting this in conversation.) 
This might justify the law’s practice from an economic point of view.  But such 
a justification would compromise the main idea behind the VAR—assuring 
control sufficient for criminal liability.  We might ultimately need to decide 
whether respecting the main idea behind the VAR in all cases is worth it.  If it 
is not, then the economic justification might just have to do. 
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The rationale for treating convictions for habitual 
actions as complying with the VAR is  
. . . [that] some habitual actions can be 
manifestations of objectionable mental states in 
the sense that matters to morality, even if they 
are not guided by one’s conscious volitions.  One 
benefit of a habit is that it produces conduct for 
which there are reasons without the agent taking 
the time to reflect on and weigh those reasons  
. . . . However, a byproduct of this valuable feature 
of habits is that they override our tendencies to 
withhold action in the face of reasons to do so.226 
 
Yaffe argues that habits often connect a mens rea with an 
actus reus to establish criminal liability.  Fred might be 
considered reckless when he strikes the pedestrian with his car.  
His habit of running through the intersection connects his 
recklessness to the striking of the pedestrian such that Fred’s 
recklessness becomes manifest in the striking.  If the law did not 
treat Fred’s habitual action as voluntary, then the VAR’s 
function of assuring correspondence between mens rea and actus 
reus would be undermined. 
This argument works well in many cases, such as Fred’s.  
When it is Fred’s recklessness that needs to get connected to the 
consequences of his conduct, things seem to turn out right vis-à-
vis the VAR.  But as Yaffe also points out, a court will treat a 
defendant’s habitual action as voluntary without any regard to 
whether the defendant is responsible for being in a situation in 
which his habit might get triggered with disastrous results.  
Fred was reckless.  He consciously disregarded the risk posed by 
heading toward the intersection, given is habit of going right 
through it without stopping.  Fred was at fault for putting 
himself into a dangerous triggering situation.  And this is why 
the Manifestation of Mens Rea Rationale works so well in Fred’s 
case. 
But what about the modified firing range case?  The soldier 
was entirely free from fault for being in a situation in which his 
 
226. Yaffe, supra note 2, at 188. 
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habit was dangerously triggered.  And the soldier had a good, 
perhaps even heroic, reason to get habituated to turn and shoot 
in the first place.  Unlike Fred’s case, there is no recklessness to 
get connected to the consequences of the soldier’s conduct to 
assure that his conduct manifests recklessness.  And it is 
difficult to see what mens rea there may be other than 
recklessness to connect to and thereby be made manifest in the 
soldier’s conduct.  There seems to be no point, in the modified 
firing range case, to assuring the manifestation of mens rea to 
justify imposing criminal liability upon the soldier. 
And this problem carries over generally to cases where a 
defendant is not morally blameworthy for being in a situation in 
which his habit might threaten the interests that criminal law 
is designed to protect.  In sum, it seems that in cases such as the 
modified firing range case it is not defensible to treat the 
defendant as though he acted voluntarily.  And the agent-causal 
retributivist has a straightforward explanation for this.  It is not 
defensible because the VAR is supposed to assure that the 
defendant has control, and in such cases the defendant lacks 
control because he does not agent-cause his conduct. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
For retributive justifications of the VAR to be plausible, 
agent causalism must be true.  The ALI clarifies that the main 
idea behind the VAR is to assure that a defendant controls any 
conduct for which she is subject to criminal liability.  For a 
retributivist, control is important because without it, the 
defendant cannot be morally responsible for her conduct and 
therefore cannot deserve punishment.  And for the defendant to 
have the requisite control, she must agent-cause her conduct.  
This result is significant because agent causalism is contentious.  
If agent causalism is false, then retributivism—one of the two 
major theories of punishment in the legal academic literature 
and judicial opinions—cannot contribute to justifying the 
fundamental predicate of criminal responsibility. 
The significance of this result is enhanced when one 
considers that agent causalism is not incoherent and is at least 
plausible.  It should be taken seriously as a possible solution to 
the problem of free will.  Additionally, if agent causalism is true, 
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then the retributivist can account not only for why the VAR is 
justified in paradigmatic cases of criminal conduct.  The agent-
causal retributivist can handle unusual cases too—including 
cases featuring complex unconscious behavior and crimes of 
omission.  Finally, the agent-causal retributivist can 
accommodate most cases in which criminal conduct is caused 
directly by habit.  It is consistent with agent-causal 
retributivism to rely on the Manifestation of Mens Rea Rationale 
for those cases, since punitive desert requires correspondence 
between mens rea and actus reus.  And in cases such as the 
modified firing range case, the agent-causal retributivist can 
explain why the law is not justified in failing to require proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of a factor necessary for criminal 
liability.  At least in such cases, the law should not continue to 
assume that a defendant’s bodily movement is voluntary simply 
because it is habitual. 
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